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Abstract 
 
The air transportation system is a vital infrastructure that enables economic 
growth and provides significant social benefits. Future increases and volatility in crude 
oil prices, as well as environmental charges, are likely to increase the effective cost of 
fuel. We investigate the impacts of effective fuel cost increase on the US air 
transportation system historically and perform a game theory analysis of the impact of 
manufacturer competition on the introduction of new, more fuel efficient aircraft.  
The cost of jet fuel increased 244% between July 2004 and July 2008, providing a 
natural experiment to evaluate how fuel price increase affected continental US networks 
and fleets. It was found that non-hub airports serving small communities lost 12% of 
connections, compared to a system-wide average loss of 2.8%. Increased effective fuel 
costs will provide incentives for airlines to improve fleet fuel efficiency, reducing the 
environmental impacts of aviation, but may cause an uneven distribution of social and 
economic impacts if small communities suffer greater loss of mobility. Government 
action may be required to determine acceptable levels of access as the system transitions 
to higher fuel costs.  
Technology innovation may act as a long-term hedge against increasing effective 
fuel costs, enabling mobility to be maintained. The single aisle commercial aircraft 
market segment is the largest, but has the longest running product lines. We hypothesize 
that competition has important effects on manufacturers’ decisions to innovate that must 
be considered when designing policies to reduce fleet emissions. An aircraft program 
valuation model is developed to estimate expected payoffs to manufacturers under 
competitive scenarios. A game theory analysis demonstrates how the incentives to 
innovate may be altered by subsidies, technology forcing regulations, increased effective 
fuel costs, the threat of new entrants, and long-term competitive strategies. Increased 
competition may result in incumbent manufacturers producing re-engined aircraft while 
increased effective fuel costs may result in new aircraft programs. Incumbents’ optimal 
strategies may be to delay the entry of new single aisle aircraft until 2020-24, unless 
technology forcing regulations are implemented. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
The air transportation system is a vital infrastructure that enables economic 
growth and provides significant social benefits. To access larger markets, businesses 
locate near airports. Families pursue global career and leisure opportunities that are only 
enabled by aviation. Hospitals require time sensitive diagnostic materials transported by 
air. There is a correlation between GDP and passenger traffic growth, as shown in Figure 
1: 
 
Figure 1. Correlation Between GDP and Passenger Traffic in the US. Data Source: BTS, 2009; Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, 2009; National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. Courtesy of Dr. P. Bonnefoy. 
  
As developing economies grow, the demand for air transportation will increase. 
Passenger traffic is expected to continue to grow at a rate of 4-6% annually while jet 
aircraft fuel efficiency has historically improved at a rate of 1.2-2.2% per year on a seat-
km basis. Fuel efficiency improvements have not been sufficient to counter increased 
emissions due to rising demand for air transport (Lee et. al., 2001). 
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Future increases and volatility in crude oil prices, as well as environmental 
charges (e.g. CO2 cap and trade, carbon taxes), are likely to increase the effective cost of 
fuel. As the supply of crude oil tightens, without significant reductions in worldwide 
demand, prices will increase. Geopolitical events and acts of nature may result in price 
surges that shock industries reliant on fossil fuel energy sources. Further, as climate 
change concerns mount, governments will face increasing pressure to take action to 
reduce the emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses. Aviation will be 
included in the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) in 2012, putting a 
price on carbon for all flights with origins or destinations in the EU. In the United States, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the 
authority to regulate greenhouse gasses under the Clean Air Act, including CO2 
emissions from transportation (Massachusetts et. al. vs. EPA, 2007). The International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has resolved to achieve an annual average fuel 
efficiency improvement of 2% until 2050 (ICAO, 2010) while the International Air 
Transport Association’s (IATA) 2050 aspirational goal is to reduce CO2 emissions from 
aviation by 50%, compared to 2005 levels (IATA, 2010). The key challenge for the air 
transportation industry is to reduce carbon emissions while sustaining mobility for 
passengers and meeting future demand in developing countries. 
In this report We investigate the impacts of effective fuel cost increase on the US 
air transportation system historically and perform a game theory analysis of the impact of 
manufacturer competition on the introduction of new, more fuel efficient aircraft that 
may act as a long-term hedge against effective fuel cost increase. 
1.2 Macroeconomic Model of the Air Transportation System 
Air transportation has substantial economic benefits, directly employing 5.5 
million and generating an estimated 31.9 million aviation related jobs globally. 
Aviation’s 2007 global economic impact was estimated to be $3,557 billion or 7.5% of 
world GDP (IATA, 2010). The economy and the air transportation system are 
interconnected, as shown by the feedback loops in the conceptual model in Figure 2. 
While the economy creates demand for travel, the air transportation system has direct, 
indirect, and induced employment effects on the economy. Increased access to people, 
markets, ideas, and capital create economic enabling effects that can catalyze economic 
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growth. The effective cost of fuel is influenced by crude oil prices as well as domestic 
and international market-based carbon policies. Changes in the effective cost of fuel 
affect the air transportation system on: (1) the supply-side, through pricing and 
scheduling, networks and fleet; and (2) the demand-side, through the economy. 
Governments can take action to reduce declines in air service by providing subsidies to 
airlines for essential routes that would otherwise not be served. 
 
 
Figure 2. Air Transportation System and Effective Fuel Cost 
Macroeconomic Interaction Model. Adapted from Tam and Hansman, 2003. 
 
Peak oil theory predicts continued volatility and increasing costs of fossil fuels 
while new environmentally driven charges are expected to further add to fuel costs, 
impacting airlines’ financial performance, technology and operational change uptake, as 
well as the provision of air service nationwide. These future scenarios motivate the need 
to understand how air transportation networks and fleets will evolve with increasing 
effective fuel costs. 
1.3 Reducing Commercial Aviation’s CO2 Emissions 
Sgouridis, Bonnefoy, and Hansman (2010) highlighted five levers to reduce CO2 
emissions from aviation: 
• Technological Efficiency Improvements: improving aircraft fuel efficiency. 
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• Operational Efficiency Improvements: improving airline and air traffic control 
operations. 
• Alternative Fuels: transitioning aircraft energy supply to fuels that have lower 
lifecycle CO2 emissions than traditional oil-based jet fuels. 
• Demand Shift: reducing demand for air transportation, or shifting demand to 
other modes. 
• Carbon Pricing: increasing the effective price of fuel and reducing demand 
through the price-demand elasticity relationship (i.e. market-based incentives). 
 
Kar (2010) identified 41 CO2 mitigating measures and estimated the potential 
reductions in US fleet emissions based on published data of the availability and 
magnitude of each measure, as shown in Figure 3. Although operations improvements 
and technology retrofits can be implemented in the short-term, technology improvements 
on new aircraft represent the largest source of potential carbon emission reductions in the 
long-term. 
 
 
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
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Ɣ Measures with medium-term start date and ultra long diffusion time include among others using composites for 
structures to reduce weight of aircraft, using no bleed architecture and developing new all (or more)-electric 
planes. The reductions in emissions f o  individual measures range from 1 to 20%. 
Ɣ Measures with long-term start date of implementation and medium diffusion time include a technology measure 
(riblets) and an operational measure (flying optimized routes). Thes measures have the potential to reduce 
emissions by 1 to 2% per measure. 
Ɣ Measures with long-term start date and ultra long diffusion time include technology measures such as new 
engines (e.g. geared turbofan, open rotor), next generation high bypass ratio engines, laminar flow airframes as 
well as N+1 and N+2 subsonic NASA aircraft. Second and third generation biofuels also exhibit these diffusion 
characteristics and have a significant potential for CO2 lifecycle savings. 
Ɣ Measures with ultra long-term start date and ultra long diffusion time that tend to be less certain include new 
aircraft technologies like NASA N+3 aircraft and higher aspect ratio wings. 
C . Cumulative estimation of the potential for C O 2 emissions reduction by category of measures 
Based on the portfolio of measures presented in Table 1, an assessment of the relative potential for CO2 emission 
reduction over time (by category of measures) was conducted. Using the Bass iffusion model presented in section
II.A, s-curves were generated for each of the measures listed in the four categories of (1) technology improvements 
through new aircraft, (2) technology improvements through the retrofit of components of existing aircraft (3) 
operational improvements and (4) alternative fuels. Technology measures that are components and will be 
introduced with new aircraft were not included since they are accounted for in the potential reductions from new 
aircraft. Each s-curve was constructed 
using the parameters presented in columns 
6-8 in Table 1 and formed the basis of an 
aggregate model to estimate potential fleet 
wide reduction in CO2 emissions. 
Several assumptions were made for 
the construction of the aggregate CO2 
reduction system model. For estimating 
the benefits, the baseline for system wide 
fuel consumption (and CO2 emissions) 
was set at the levels of the 2006 US fleet. 
The benefits from the four categories of 
measures were assumed independent from 
each other i.e. the adoption of one 
category of measure did not affect the 
uptake of another category.  
To model the improvements from new 
aircraft introduction, the fleet itself was 
divided into four non-overlapping 
categories, based on the number of seats. 
In order to exclude the effects of changes 
in demand and therefore keep the total 
fleet size constant, each new aircraft was assumed to replace an older aircraft in one of these categories. The C-
series/MRJ replaced aircraft in the 50-120 seat range, N+1/N+3 in the 120-200 seat range, B787/A350 in the 200-
300 seat range, and N+2 in the 300 and above seat range. The N+3 aircraft replaced N+1 aircraft after entry into 
service. The impacts of in-production aircraft from 2006 onwards on the system were not included in the model. 
Retrofitting older aircraft with new technology was assumed to have two key diffusion dynamics: a) engines and 
engine cores were replaced on 10-year-old airframes and winglets, riblets and laminar nacelles were retrofitted on 5-
year airframes during the first D-check and b) retrofits (and one time operational improvements such as reducing 
cabin weight) stay in the system till the older aircraft are replaced with newer aircraft. It was assumed that no new 
aircraft is retrofitted. 
With regard to the diffusion of biofuels, the use of second-generation biofuels was assumed to continue till the 
third-generation biofuels are available. Both biofuels were used as 50-50 blends with regular jet fuel. 
Figure 10 shows the cumulative reductions of CO2 emissions from four categories of measures. The model 
suggests that retrofits as well as operational improvements have the potential to contribute to reductions in CO2 
emissions in the short- to medium-term. The improvements from component retrofits decline with increasing fleet 
F igure 11: Cumulative Potential Reductions in C O 2 Emissions 
from 2006 to 2050 
 
Figure 3. Cumulative Potential Reductions in CO2 Emissions from 
2006 to 2050. Source: Kar, 2009. 
 
Before technology improvements are implemented in new aircraft, manufacturers 
must have the inc n ives to innovate. New aircraft progr ms off r the largest potential 
gains in fu l efficiency, b t are risky and require large capital investments. Re-engining 
existing airframes reduces risk and capital requirements but offers lower potential fuel 
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burn improvements. Maintaining existing aircraft with incremental improvements may 
entail the lowest risk. We hypothesize that competition has important effects on 
manufacturers’ decisions to innovate that must be considered when designing policies to 
reduce fleet emissions. Therefore, to understand what policies are likely to be effective at 
reducing new aircraft fuel intensity, the effects of competition must be understood. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
 Chapter 2 outlines this report’s research questions and approach. An empirical 
analysis of the 2004-08 fuel price surge is used as a case study in Chapter 3 to 
demonstrate the impacts of effective fuel cost increase on the US air transportation 
system. These impacts are extrapolated to further understanding of the potential short- 
and mid-term consequences of effective fuel cost increase. The introduction of new, more 
fuel-efficient aircraft is a primary option to adjust to higher effective fuel prices without 
reducing air service. Chapter 4 provides the background of how aircraft manufacturer 
competition impacts fleet emissions and how fuel efficiency improvements can be 
accelerated through changes in the single aisle aircraft market structure. An aircraft 
program valuation model is developed in Chapter 5 that is used to estimate the rank 
ordering of aircraft manufacturer payoffs under different competitive scenarios. A game 
theory analysis of aircraft manufacturer competition is performed in Chapter 6, furthering 
understanding of how technology innovation can be accelerated to initiate a long-term 
hedge against effective fuel cost increase that reduces the environmental impacts of 
aviation. Chapter 7 concludes the report and outlines future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 Research Approach 
 
 
2.1 Research Questions 
 The air transportation system provides significant economic and social benefits to 
the communities and nations it connects. But the burning of fossil fuel impacts climate. 
Pressure will mount for aviation to reduce CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. 
Without safety certified alternative energy sources available in the required quantities, 
increasing effective fuel costs and political pressure will compel commercial aviation to 
adapt – either through reductions in service or improvements in efficiency. Reductions in 
service will diminish the economic and social benefits of aviation to some communities 
while efficiency improvements will require technology innovation and operational 
changes.  
The first question posed in this report is:  
 
• Question 1: If the effective cost of fuel increases, what are the potential impacts 
on the US air transportation system?  
 
This question is answered by performing a historical analysis of the 2004 to 2008 fuel 
price surge in Chapter 3. 
Given the expected impacts of future fuel price surges and permanent increases in 
the effective cost of fuel, fuel efficiency and CO2 mitigating measures are investigated in 
the remaining chapters. Previous work has determined that technologies on new aircraft 
could be the largest non-alternative jet fuel lever in reducing CO2 emissions from 
aviation. Single aisle, 150-seat jets form the backbone of the world’s fleet and are 
expected to continue to be the largest market segment. But the incumbent large 
commercial aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus have not made significant 
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improvements to their 737 and A320 single aisle families for a decade. We hypothesize 
that in a duopoly market where both manufacturers have existing single aisle aircraft 
families and fuel prices are low, neither competitor has an incentive to produce a clean 
sheet design aircraft that offers significant performance improvements. New aircraft lines 
require significant research, development, testing and evaluation investments, are 
technically risky, and may cannibalize the sales of existing overlapping product lines. 
Production learning curves require manufacturers to produce and sell initial aircraft at a 
net loss in order to gain the experience required to improve production processes and 
reduce unit costs. Profitability is only achieved as volumes rise (Benkard, 2000). As the 
effects of the learning curve are negated with the introduction of a new product line, the 
incentive to introduce a new aircraft is reduced. To explore the impacts of aircraft 
manufacturer competition on introducing new, more fuel-efficient product lines, the 
second research question posed is:  
 
• Question 2: What scenarios are likely to result in the development and production 
of new single aisle aircraft with significant fuel efficiency improvements? 
 
This research focuses on the factors or policies that may change the dynamics of aircraft 
manufacturer competition to incentivize the development of a new aircraft and to 
compare these factors on the basis of expected impact on fleet carbon emissions. 
Understanding how competition impacts the decision to invest in new aircraft designs 
may assist policy makers in developing regulatory mechanisms to improve aviation’s fuel 
efficiency and can inform expectations of the introduction of new aircraft for global 
aviation emission models. This question is answered by performing a game theory 
analysis of single aisle manufacturer competition in Chapters 4 through 6. 
2.2 Research Approach 
 This section outlines the approach used to answer the research questions posed. 
 
Question 1: Impacts of Effective Fuel Cost Increase 
The 2004-08 period provided a natural experiment that is used as a case study in 
Chapter 3 to evaluate how fuel price increases affected air transportation networks and 
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fleets. Comparative analyses were performed over two time periods: (1) July 2004-08, 
and (2) July 2007-08. The July 2004-08 time period was selected to demonstrate 
medium-term trends in airline decisions when facing increasing fuel costs, while the July 
2007-08 time period was selected to examine short-term trends. Primary focus was 
placed on the July 2007-08 period, as the rate of fuel cost increase was greatest and 
airline decisions were likely to have been made under forecasts of continued high, or 
increasing, fuel costs. Comparing network and fleet changes between the same months in 
subsequent years avoided introducing seasonal effects in the analysis. By July 2004, US 
domestic supply (as measured in available seat miles, ASM) had recovered to pre-
September 11, 2001 levels and one year had passed since the SARS pandemic of May-
July 2003. Also, US gross domestic product (GDP) was increasing during this time 
period, peaking in nominal terms in Q3 2008. Therefore, the effects of the demand shift 
due to the 2008-2010 financial crisis do not impact the analysis. 
 The air transportation system is influenced by multiple factors. Between Q3 2007 
and 2008, real GDP remained relatively constant. There were no major US air safety or 
security incidents during this period, and US passenger carrier operations did not result in 
any fatalities. Airline competition (as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index1) 
changed from 0.082 to 0.083, indicating a marginally less competitive industry. Airline 
labor costs, as reported by the Air Transport Association (2010), decreased 3.9% between 
Q3 2007 and 2008. As the rate of change of these factors was dwarfed by the escalation 
of fuel costs, it was assumed that fuel cost increase was the dominant causal factor during 
the July 2007-08 time period. During the July 2004-08 time period, several major US 
carriers entered Chapter 11 bankruptcy, three accidents occurred involving passenger 
fatalities,2 and real GDP increased 8.6%. This time period is used to put changes 
observed July 2007-08 into historical perspective and to identify medium-term trends in 
airline behavior. This study does not account for the effect of changes in economic 
activity, or other exogenous variables, on the air transportation system. 
                                                
1 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) was calculated as the sum of the squares of the domestic revenue 
passenger mile (RPM) market share of all US passenger carriers reported in BTS Form 41 Schedule T2. 
2 US carrier accidents involving passenger fatalities, July 2004-08: (1) 0/19/04 Kirksville, MO, Corporate 
Airlines, British Aerospace Jetstream 32, (2) 12/19/05 Miami, FL, Chalks Ocean Airways, Grumman G-
73T, (3) 08/27/06 Lexington, KY, Comair, Bombardier CRJ-100 (National Transportation Safety Board, 
2010).  
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 Many airlines dampen fuel cost volatility by adopting financial fuel price hedging 
strategies. Over the time frame of this study, successful hedging strategies likely provided 
significant cost advantages to individual airlines. The magnitude of the fuel price increase 
implies that, in the future, hedging prices will increase and will account for such extremes 
in volatility. Therefore, fuel price hedging cannot be considered a sufficient measure of 
protection against systemic fuel price increases. Actions other than hedging are the 
subject of this report, including changes to airline network and fleet assignments. 
 The data used for these analyses was obtained from the Bureau of Transportation 
Statistics (BTS) Form 41 databases. For data consistency and availability reasons, the 
analysis was generally limited in scope to the continental US domestic air transportation 
system. Data was filtered to exclude cargo service, military flights, repositioning flights 
(i.e. departures performed with zero passengers reported), and sightseeing (i.e. departures 
performed whose origin and destination were the same airport). Based on these datasets, 
a comparative analysis of the continental US air transportation network and fleet at the 
airport and route levels was conducted. In addition, the effect of changes in air service 
provision on population access was evaluated. 
To provide potential causal explanations for the observed effects on network and 
fleet from the case study, complementary analyses were conducted, including: the 
evaluation of aircraft fuel intensity, airline economics, and airfare time series analyses. 
Finally, effects observed in the case study were extrapolated to various scenarios in 
which effective fuel cost increases are expected to discuss their potential consequences.  
 
Question 2: Game Theory Analysis of Single Aisle Aircraft Manufacturer Competition 
 To answer the second question posed, a three-staged approach was used. First, 
static and dynamic game structures for a two- and three-player market are constructed in 
Chapter 4. Second, an aircraft program valuation model is developed to estimate payoffs 
to manufacturers under different market share, fuel price, and demand scenarios in 
Chapter 5. Third, a game theory analysis is used to model competitive forces impacting 
manufacturer decisions in Chapter 6. Policy options are tested to determine their 
outcomes in a competitive market, based on the assumptions in the valuation model. 
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We chose a game theoretic framework to investigate the dynamics of aircraft 
manufacturer competition as it accounts for the presence of multiple actors, all of who 
make rational decisions in accordance with their own best interests. It was further 
assumed that all players act with the knowledge that all other players make rational 
decisions. This framework enables the discovery of each player’s best response to the 
predicted strategy of all other players. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to determine aircraft manufacturer profitability, 
but rather to estimate the rank ordering of payoffs to determine how changes in the 
market structure may alter the equilibrium game outcome using a consistent framework 
for comparison. Unfortunately, such analysis is hindered by the proprietary nature of 
aircraft program economic data. Reasonable assumptions, based on publicly available 
data sources, are used as proxies while a sensitivity analysis demonstrates the extent to 
which these assumptions impact the findings. The aircraft performance parameter of 
interest in this report is fuel intensity - the energy consumed per unit of output. As a 
proxy, the fuel burn per seat mile is used. Efficiency improvements are meant to indicate 
reductions in fuel intensity. 
Both Airbus and Boeing have complete product lines that span all 100+ seat 
market segments. Decisions within one market segment are constrained by the state of 
products in other market segments. Limited engineering resources and capital have 
historically prevented manufacturers from undertaking more than one major aircraft 
design program at any one time. This analysis neglects this complexity, assuming 
manufacturers make decisions regarding the single aisle market without constraints 
imposed by decisions regarding the twin aisle markets. Benkard (2004) developed an 
empirical dynamic oligopoly model of the wide-bodied commercial aircraft industry used 
to analyze industry pricing, aircraft production costs, aircraft performance, and policy. He 
assumed that unobservable aircraft characteristics that are known to buyers (i.e. quality) 
could be represented with a stochastic Markov process that he empirically estimated to 
determine that they do not affect production costs. Benkard’s quality parameter and 
engine number were used as proxies for fuel efficiency. My approach does not follow an 
empirical econometric analysis. We focus on assumed fuel efficiencies under varying 
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external conditions to estimate the expected demand preference among aircraft product 
lines offered by competing manufacturers. 
 
 
 
 
 22 of 113 
CHAPTER 3 
3.0 Impacts of Effective Fuel Cost Increase 
 
 
The cost of aviation fuel increased 244% between July 2004 and July 2008, 
becoming the largest operating cost item for airlines (Air Transport Association (ATA), 
2010a). Figure 2 depicts a conceptual model showing the linkages between the air 
transportation system and economy. Changes in the effective cost of fuel affect the air 
transportation system on: (1) the supply-side, through pricing and scheduling, networks 
and fleet; and (2) the demand-side, through the economy. A key contributor to the 
effective cost of fuel is the price of crude oil. As shown in Figure 4, jet fuel prices surged 
from an average of $0.72/gallon in January 2000 to a peak of  $3.82/gallon in July 2008, 
trending closely with crude oil prices. During the period of the highest rate of increase, 
July 2007-08, jet fuel prices climbed 82%. It is expected that increases in the effective 
cost of fuel impact the balance of supply and demand in the system, resulting in changes 
in airline supply (i.e. network and fleet). To prepare for higher oil and carbon prices in 
the future, there is a need to understand how fuel price increases have historically 
impacted the air transportation network and fleet assignment decisions, and the 
effectiveness of government policies in meeting socioeconomic and environmental 
objectives. 
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Figure 4. Trends in Crude Oil and Jet Fuel Prices During the Time 
Periods of Study. Data Source: ATA, 2010a. 
 
 In Section 3.1, the continental US system during the 2004-08 fuel price surge is 
analyzed to improve understanding of how air transportation networks and fleet may 
evolve under volatile and upward trending effective fuel costs in the future. We use two 
time periods – July 2004-08 and July 2007-08 - as natural experiments to understand 
short- and medium-term effects of fuel cost increase and volatility on the behavior of 
airlines in a competitive system. Potential explanations of the effects of the fuel price 
surge are described in Section 3.2. Future effective fuel cost increase scenarios, possible 
long-term consequences of the evolution of the system observed in the time periods of the 
study, and potential fuel efficiency measures are discussed in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 
outlines the role of government in mitigating negative impacts resulting from uneven 
reductions in air service while conclusions are drawn in Section 3.5. To mitigate negative 
social and economic impacts from future fuel price surges, action is needed to improve 
fuel efficiency of the air transportation system. Chapters 4 through 6 examine how 
aircraft manufacturers may be incentivized to develop fuel-efficient aircraft. 
3.1 Historical Case Study: 2004-08 Fuel Price Surge  
Fuel became the greatest expense for the aviation industry in 2006 when it 
surpassed labor, the second largest airline cost component, as shown in Figure 5: 
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Figure 5. Trends in US Airline Industry Unit Operating Costs.  
Data source: ATA, 2010b. 
 
A combination of increasing fuel costs and decreasing labour costs due to industry 
restructuring led to this change in share of direct operating costs. As fuel costs have 
become a larger share of industry revenue, changes in the effective cost of fuel have had 
a greater impact on airline decisions and profit margins. The impacts on network 
structure, changes to passenger access to the air transportation system, and the impacts on 
airlines will be discussed in this section.  
 
Impacts on Network Structure 
Comparative analysis of the network structure in the periods July 2004-08 and 
July 2007-08 showed that a reallocation of resources throughout the continental US air 
transportation network occurred. July 2004-08, the aggregate number of departures 
performed were reduced by 2.8%, while this number dropped by 1.6% July 2007-08. 
Some airports experienced greater reductions in service than others. Figure 6 and Figure 
7 show relative and absolute changes in passenger departures performed at continental 
US airports July 2004-08. Changes in departures at individual airports are used as a proxy 
for access to the national air transportation system. A reduction in access to the system is 
expected to have social and economic impacts in the airport catchment area as passengers 
and businesses are forced to find alternative modes of transportation, likely resulting in 
increased travel time. The relative and absolute changes in airport traffic demonstrate 
volatility at small and large airports throughout the country. 
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Figure 8 categorizes airports by the number of departures per day in July 2007. 
Small airports, with fewer than an average of 300 departures per day, lost relatively more 
traffic than larger airports July 2007-08. These small airports correspond to non-hub, 
small hub, and medium hub classes, as defined by the FAA (2008) based on the number 
of passenger boardings in the year 2007, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
Figure 6. July 2004-2008 Relative Changes in US Airports’ Continental US Passenger Departures and Top 10 
Relative Gains and Losses. Data Source: BTS, 2010b. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. July 2004-2008 Absolute Changes in US Airports’ Continental US Passenger Departures and Top 10 
Absolute Gains and Losses. Data Source: BTS, 2010b. 
 Airport HubClass ΔDepartures 
1 Kenmore, WA NonHub 271 ∞ 
2 Santa Rosa, CA NonHub 182 ∞ 
3 New York, NY NonHub 137 ∞ 
4 Plattsburgh, NY EAS 116 ∞ 
5 Phoenix, AZ NonHub 90 ∞ 
6 Del Rio, TX NonHub 84 ∞ 
7 Alamogordo, NM NonHub 59 ∞ 
8 New York, NY NonHub 57 ∞ 
9 Palmdale, CA NonHub 57 ∞ 
10 Vernal, UT EAS 56 ∞ 
….. 
466 Columbia, MO EAS -109 -100% 
467 Enid, OK NonHub -124 -100% 
468 El Dorado, AR EAS -130 -100% 
469 Watertown, NY EAS -152 -100% 
470 Hot Springs, AR EAS -155 -100% 
471 Prescott, AZ EAS -156 -100% 
472 Trenton, NJ NonHub -161 -100% 
473 Lake Havasu City, AZ NonHub -166 -100% 
474 Peach Springs, AZ NonHub -227 -100% 
475 Killeen, TX NonHub -409 -100% 
 
 Airport HubClass ΔDepartures 
1 Charlotte, NC Large 4307 27.8% 
2 New York, NY Large 3933 50.5% 
3 Houston, TX Large 3336 19.0% 
4 Denver, CO Large 2812 12.3% 
5 Philadelphia, PA Large 2467 16.5% 
6 San Francisco Large 2069 18.5% 
7 Las Vegas, NV Large 1150 7.7% 
8 San Diego, CA Large 1128 14.7% 
9 Indianapolis, IN Medium 849 17.0% 
10 Dallas/Ft. Wrth (DAL) Medium 805 21.8% 
….. 
466 Boston, MA Large -901 -5.8% 
467 Albany, NY Small -1245 -38.3% 
468 Detroit, MI Large -1803 -9.1% 
469 Chicago, IL (MDW) Large -2261 -21.8% 
470 Chicago, IL (ORD) Large -2566 -7.0% 
471 Minneapolis, MN Large -3411 -16.9% 
472 Washington,DC (IAD) Large -4287 -27.6% 
473 Dallas/Ft.Wrth (DFW) Large -4872 -16.0% 
474 Pittsburgh, PA Medium -6551 -53.5% 
475 Covington, KY Large -7205 -38.1% 
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 Table 1 also shows that small airports were disproportionately affected. July 
2007-08, 70 airports lost all service and 32 airports gained service, resulting in a net loss 
of 38 airports. The net change July 2004-08 was a loss of 10 airports with service. 
Airports that lost all service were generally small airports with fewer than seven domestic 
departures performed per day in July 2007. GAO (2009) reported that 38 airports with 
routes receiving Essential Air Service (EAS) subsidies lost all service July 2007-08 (as 
discussed further in Section 3.4). It is expected that the social and economic effects of 
reductions in access to the national air transportation system would be greatest at airports 
that lost all service or experienced a prolonged period without service.  
 
Figure 8. July 2007-08 Relative Changes in Airports’ Continental Passenger 
Departures per Day, Binned by Airports’ Size. 
 
Table 1. Number of Airports by Class with 
Continental US Passenger Departures. 
Airport 
Hub Class 
Boardings July 
2004 
July 
2007 
July 
2008 
Large ≥1% 32 32 32 
Medium 0.25-1% 37 37 37 
Small 0.05-0.25% 63 63 63 
NonHub 0-0.05% 245 276 257 
EAS* 0-0.05% 98 95 76 
 Total: 475 503 465 
 
Airport classes held constant from the full year 
2007 for analyses.  
 
*Indicates airports serviced by Essential Air 
Service (EAS) subsidized routes. All EAS 
airports were NonHub airports. 
 
Data Source: BTS, 2010b; FAA, 2008; Office 
of Aviation Analysis, 2010. 
Table 2. Changes in Continental US 
Passenger Departures by Airport Class, July 
2007-08. Data Source:  BTS, 2010b. 
 NonHub Small Medium Large 
NonHub -2922 -358 -2549 -359 
 -18% -20% -24% -0.4% 
Small  132 420 -1365 
  15% 2.6% -1.0% 
Medium   -3633 -3787 
   -11% -1.7% 
Large    1849 
    0.7% 
   Total: -12572 
    -1.6% 
Percentage values represent the relative change 
in number of departures performed from each 
connection class in July 2007.  
 
Figure 9. Origin Airport Class Change in Departures. 
Data Source:  BTS, 2010b.  
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The July 2007-08 comparative network analysis was also performed at the origin-
destination flight segment level. During this period, continental US departures were 
reduced by over 12,500. Table 2 shows the changes in departures between airport classes. 
Large-to-large hub connections increased while Figure 9 demonstrates that non-hub 
airports lost relatively more departures over both of the study periods. Small 
communities, serviced by non-hub airports, lost relatively more access to the national air 
transportation system than large communities. 
 The level of spatial and temporal concentration can be used to describe airline 
networks. Networks with a high number of flights into and out of one airport are spatially 
concentrated while flights that are organized to make connections with other flights are 
temporally concentrated. While hub-and-spoke networks are spatially and temporally 
concentrated to facilitate connections, point-to-point networks are generally temporally 
disperse, but not necessarily spatially concentrated due to the organization of 
maintenance and operational bases. Burghouwt (2005) describes four extreme network 
configurations, between which many intermediary networks may exist, as shown in Table 
3 and Figure 10. 
 
Table 3. The Airline Network Configuration Matrix. Source: Burghouwt, 2005. 
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Figure 10. Airline Network Configurations. Source: Burghouwt, 2005. 
 
 Cento (2009) proposed using the Freeman network centrality index to measure the 
strength of hub-and-spoke vs. point-to-point networks. In a pure hub-and-spoke network, 
all airports are connected through one hub. In a pure point-to-point network, all airports 
are connected directly to every other airport in the network. The Freeman network 
centrality index uses the weighted average of paths through each airport connecting every 
other airport in the network, normalized by the maximum value achieved by a pure hub-
and-spoke network. Therefore, for a pure hub-and-spoke network the Freeman index is 1, 
while for a fully connected point-to-point network the Freeman index is 0. The reduction 
in the number of non-hub airports, as well as the reductions in connections originating in 
non-hub and medium hub airports, led to a strengthening of hub-and-spoke networks July 
2007-08. System-wide, the Freeman index increased from 0.17 to 0.26 - its largest 
change in the decade - as shown in Figure 11. 
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Figure 11. Continental US Air Transportation Network Freeman Index, 
2004-08. All Airlines 
 
Airlines employed different network strategies. An analysis of the two largest 
airlines (by July 2007 ASM) in each category (as defined in the Appendix), demonstrates 
differing trends, as shown in Figure 12: 
 
Figure 12. Continental US Airline Network Freeman Indices, 2004-08  
Top Two Category Airlines, by July 2007 ASM 
 
July 2007-08, United Airlines significantly strengthened its hub-and-spoke network 
against the trend of the previous three years. American Airlines’ network remained more 
spatially disperse. Over the period investigated, Southwest Airlines trended towards a 
more concentrated hub-and-spoke network while its LCC peer, JetBlue, moved towards a 
point-to-point network as it expanded to routes away from its New York JFK base. While 
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ExpressJet moved towards a point-to-point network in the first years of this analysis, this 
trend reversed during the peak of the fuel price surge, July 2007-08. 
 A relative shift towards longer haul flights occurred during this time period. The 
average stage length3 of continental US passenger departures increased from 609 miles in 
July 2004 to 626 miles (July 2007) and 632 miles (July 2008) due to the addition of long 
haul connections and reductions in the number of short-haul connections.  
 
Impacts on Access to the Air Transportation System 
During the period of steepest increase in fuel prices, July 2007-08, service was 
reduced for small and remote communities. For each of the airports that lost all service, 
the distance to the next nearest airport with traffic was calculated using Google Maps 
(2009), as shown in Figure 13. The average driving distance to the next nearest airport 
with service was 57 miles, corresponding to an average driving time of 75 minutes. The 
maximum driving distance was 208 miles, from Miles City, MN to Sheridan, WY.  
 
Figure 13. Next Nearest Airport with Passenger Departures to Airports 
that Lost All Service, July 2007-08. Data Source: Google, 2009. 
 
 The percent of continental US population living within 40 miles of an airport with 
regular service dropped 1.4% to 88.9% July 2007-08, as shown in Figure 14. This was 
determined by calculating the great circle distance from year 2000 US census SF3 tract 
internal coordinates to the nearest airport with at least one reported passenger departure 
                                                
3 Stage length is a flight leg’s great circle distance from the origin to destination airport. 
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per week, and summing the cumulative percent of the population. The number of airports 
with regular service increased July 2004-07, largely due to increases in EAS funding, as 
discussed in Section 3.4. The drop in the number of airports with regular service July 
2007-08 resulted from a number of airlines serving small communities suffering 
financially. The selection of new air service providers for EAS subsidized routes restored 
service to most airports by July 2009. Access to the national air transportation system for 
a significant portion of the population is sensitive to the financial viability of regional and 
commuter airlines, as well as government subsidies. 
 
 
Figure 14. Continental US Access to Airports with Regular Service. 
Data Source:  BTS, 2010b;  GeoLytics, 2000.  
 
Impacts on Airlines 
Airlines suffered financially during the fuel price surge, although regional and 
commuter airlines suffered relatively more in the July 2007-08 period. 11 of 107 (10.3%) 
US passenger carriers ceased operations July 2007-08, of which ten were regional or 
commuter airlines. Virgin America and Lynx Aviation commenced operations during this 
time period. Although representing a large percentage of total airlines, airlines ceasing 
passenger operations accounted for only 1.5% of domestic ASM in July 2007. Thirteen 
passenger carriers declared bankruptcy in 2004-2005, including legacy carriers US 
Airways, Delta Air Lines and Northwest Airlines, although many of these carriers 
continued operations. The fuel surge of July 2007-08 demonstrated that smaller, 
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regionally focused airlines tend to have less ability to handle the financial stress caused 
by fuel price increase and volatility. 
 Grouping US carriers as Network Legacy Carriers (NLC), Low Cost Carriers 
(LCC), Regional, and Commuter (as defined in the Appendix), Table 4 shows that NLCs 
reduced domestic capacity most aggressively while LCCs added domestic available seat 
miles (ASM) market share, which increased from 18% in July 2004 to 26% in July 2008. 
Regional airlines were slower to cut capacity July 2007-08, with a 3.1% drop in ASM, 
but suffered a larger relative drop in demand with a 6.8% drop in revenue passenger 
miles (RPM).  
 July 2004-08  July 2007-08 
 RPM ASM  RPM ASM 
NLC -2.1% -2.9%  -4.5% -2.8% 
LCC 12.4% 12.1%  2.3% 5.9% 
Regional 1.1% 0.8%  -6.8% -3.1% 
 
Table 4. Annualized Changes in US Carrier Domestic Supply 
and Demand, by Airline Class. Data Source: BTS, 2010b.  
 
Much of the volatility in the number of airports with service was due to the 
cessation of operations of Air Midwest and Big Sky Airlines. These airlines were the sole 
carriers serving 20 communities of the 70 that lost all service. Small community access is 
sensitive to the operations of individual airlines, especially regional airlines that may not 
have the same access to financing as larger airlines.  
 While US carriers reduced domestic capacity, NLCs increased international 
capacity 6.6% July 2007-08, as shown in Table 5. Although LCCs showed large relative 
gains in international traffic July 2004-08, LCCs provided less than 3% of US carrier 
international ASMs in July 2008 while NLCs provided 94%. This increase in 
international capacity is part of a longer-term trend: NLC international ASMs increased 
28% July 2004-08. These figures indicate a change in the primary provider of air 
transport in continental US as LCCs increase their market share, NLCs transfer capacity 
to international routes, and regional carriers focus on domestic routes. 
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 July 2004-08  July 2007-08 
 RPM ASM  RPM ASM 
NLC 7.1% 7.1%  4.5% 6.6% 
LCC 18.4% 16.9%  -2.3% -7.0% 
Regional -5.4% -6.0%  -25% -24% 
 
Table 5. Annualized Changes in US Carrier International 
Supply and Demand, by Airline Class. Data Source: BTS, 2010 
 
3.2 Potential Factors Influencing Airline and Passenger Decisions under Increasing Effective Fuel 
Prices 
This section proposes possible explanations of the observed effects on the air 
transportation system during the fuel price surge. The US domestic aviation industry is 
highly competitive and numerous exogenous factors influence stakeholder decisions in 
addition to fuel prices, including: economic activity, financial markets, competing modes 
of transportation, competition among airlines, airport construction, regulations, foreign 
affairs, terrorist events, and security concerns. We focus on the impacts of increases in 
the effective cost of fuel. 
Increases in the effective cost of fuel impact the air transportation system through 
the supply-side and the demand-side of the market for air transport. Supply-side effects 
include increases in direct operating costs of airlines, resulting in changes to networks 
and fleet assignments. Demand-side effects are due to reductions in economic activity, as 
well as passenger and freight sensitivity to fare increases.  
Bruekner and Zhang (2010) explored the effect of airline emission charges on 
airfares, airline service quality, aircraft design features, and network structure by 
developing a theoretical model of competing duopoly airlines. Emission charges were 
included as an increase in the effective cost of fuel, although the volume of passengers 
was kept fixed, avoiding the complexity of the price elasticity of demand. Their research 
showed an increase in fuel price will lead to higher fares, lower flight frequency, a higher 
load factor, more fuel efficient aircraft, and an unchanged aircraft size. Further, using a 
simplified network model, they showed that hub and spoke networks are strengthened by 
increases in effective fuel cost, except under certain conditions. This report provides 
empirical findings that support the conclusions of the theoretical model  
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Supply-side 
Changes in the share of direct operating costs require airlines to alter their 
resource allocation. As fuel costs per ASM exceeded 5¢ (as shown in Figure 5), airlines 
altered their fleet assignments and network structures. While decreases in short-haul 
connections to thin demand markets were discussed in the previous section, two other 
trends in airline decisions during the fuel price surge were observed: (1) a reduction in 
the utilization of fuel intensive aircraft, and (2) increased costs passed through to 
passengers. 
 
Operating Fleet 
 Aircraft fuel intensity, measured in gallons of fuel per ASM varies by aircraft type 
and engine due to differences in design, weight, operations, and level of technology. 
Figure 15 shows variations in fuel intensity within and between aircraft classes.4 
Regional jets are generally more fuel intensive than turboprops of the same seat size 
when adjusted for operating range. With increasing effective fuel costs, the economic 
incentive for airlines to reduce utilization of fuel intensive aircraft increases. The number 
of regional jets in US carrier fleets has increased dramatically since introduced in the 
1990s. Increased fuel cost and changes to pilot scope clauses5 arrested this trend in 2006. 
The number of regional jets operated by US carriers increased 27% between Q3 2004-
2006 to 1605, but declined 3.6% to 1548 in Q3 2008. When fuel prices spiked in 2008, 
airlines increased utilization of turboprops and reintegrated parked turboprops into their 
fleet. The number of operating turboprops increased by ~41% from Q3 2007 to 274 (BTS 
Form 41 T2, 2010).   
                                                
4 Aircraft fuel intensity derived from Piano-X aircraft database. Fuel burn was calculated using the 
aircraft’s maximum payload at each R1 range quintile. The R1 point indicates the range at which aircraft 
must sacrifice payload to increase range. Fuel intensity was calculated as the weighted average of fuel burn 
per available seat mile (ASM) at each R1 range quintile, based on 2006 operating range frequencies. 
5 ‘Scope clauses’ are included in pilot union labor contracts to specify the maximum number and/or size of 
aircraft that mainline airlines can utilize in their low-cost operations or regional alliances (Gittell et. al., 
2009). 
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Figure 15. Aircraft Type 2006 Operating Fuel Intensity. Data Source: Piano-X Aircraft Database. 
 
 Figure 16 shows that airlines increased the miles flown for fuel-efficient aircraft 
while decreasing the miles flown for fuel inefficient aircraft July 2004-08. With a 
permanent increase in fuel cost, airlines are likely to replace fuel intensive aircraft with 
newer, fuel-efficient models. These decisions could lead to a renewed interest in 
turboprop technology, reduced regional jet purchases, and will likely lead to substantial 
interest in next generation fuel efficient aircraft such as Boeing’s 787, Airbus’s A350, 
and Bombardier’s CSeries. 
 
Figure 16. Change in Revenue Miles Flown by Aircraft Type Fuel Intensity  
Aggregated for all US Airlines, July 2004-08. 
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Fuel Cost Passed on to the Consumer in the Form of Airfare Increases 
 Competition in the airline industry has resulted in a reduction in real fares since 
deregulation in 1978. Increased fuel costs have resulted in increased costs passed through 
to passengers in the form of fuel surcharges, increased fares, and unbundling of services, 
such as checked bags and onboard meals. BTS (2009) reported average domestic air fares 
in the third quarter of 2008 to be $362, up 10.4% from the third quarter of 2007, and up 
22% from the post-September 11, 2001 third quarter low of $297 in 2004. Increased 
airfares were not distributed evenly across the system. Passengers originating in non-hub 
airports experienced a 3.9% increase in average airfares to $479 in Q3 2008 (BTS, 2010). 
Although passengers originating in non-hub airports generally face higher fares, they 
experienced a relatively smaller increase in airfares, likely due to these passengers’ 
shorter average segment stage lengths. Non-hub airports are generally connected to 
medium and large hub airports by short-haul connections flown in turboprops and 
regional jets. As stage length decreases, fuel cost as a percent of operating cost decreases, 
overtaken by maintenance and labor costs. Thus, short-haul fares are less sensitive to fuel 
cost increase (Babikian, 2002). 
 Figure 17 shows changes in US airline’s cost per available seat mile (CASM) and 
revenue per ASM (RASM) between the third quarters of 2007 and 2008. CASM 
increased 3.00¢, of which 2.20¢ was due to the increase in fuel costs. This increase in 
cost was only offset by a 0.73¢ increase in RASM, eliminating the 2007 positive profit in 
the US airline industry (ATA, 2010b). Between Q3 2004-08, fuel cost per ASM increased 
3.57¢ while revenue per ASM increased only 2.48¢. 
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Figure 17. Cost and Revenue per ASM (Excluding Taxes) - Q3 2007 
and 2008 Comparison. Data Source: ATA, 2010b. 
 
 Increased costs impact supply through airfare pricing. Increased prices impact 
demand through the price elasticity of demand for air transportation. In the short- and 
medium-term time periods of this analysis, all of the increases in fuel costs were not 
passed through to passengers. In the long-term, with increased effective fuel costs, 
airfares will need to increase and/or non-fuel related costs will need to be trimmed to 
compensate for the change in direct operating costs, or the industry will not be financially 
sustainable. 
 
Demand-side 
The amount of fuel cost increase passed on to the consumer has an effect on 
demand for air transport through the price elasticity of demand. In general, when other 
influences on demand remain unchanged, a higher price for a product results in a lower 
quantity demanded. The price elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of demand to 
changes in the price. If the change in quantity demanded is greater than the change in 
price, the demand is said to be elastic. If the change in quantity demanded is less than the 
change in price, the demand is said to be inelastic. 
 Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart (2008) compiled multiple studies on the price 
elasticity of demand for air transportation, as shown in Figure 18. The price elasticity of 
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demand was found to differ between short-haul and long-haul travel, domestic and 
international, as well as between leisure and business travel. Short-haul, leisure travel 
was found to be the most price elastic while long-haul international business travel was 
found to be the least. Alternative modes of travel, such as rail, bus, and automobiles, are 
close substitutes to short-haul air transportation, whereas there are no close substitutes to 
long-haul air travel. It is expected that demand for air transport is less elastic for longer 
flights. As international travel is generally spread over more time than domestic travel - 
making airfare a smaller proportion of the overall trip cost - international travelers are 
generally less sensitive to changes in ticket prices.  
 
 
Figure 18. Price Elasticities of Demand for Air Transportation 
Source: Gillen, Morrison, and Stewart, 2008. 
 
 During the periods of study it was found that connections to short-haul markets 
were reduced, average stage length increased, and international traffic grew. Airlines 
made strategic decisions on how to maintain revenues while facing higher operating 
costs. This led to reductions in service to markets in which passengers are more sensitive 
to airfare increases, and increases in international traffic for passengers less sensitive to 
airfare increases. Further, Airbus (2010) forecasts North American domestic passenger 
traffic to grow at 1.6%/year for the period 2009-2018, while passenger traffic to 
international destinations is forecasted to grow at a rate of 4.5%/year over the same 
period. As the continental US market approaches saturation, airlines are seeking higher 
growth markets on which they are able to maintain higher yields (i.e. unit revenue). 
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3.3 Extrapolating Findings to Future Scenarios 
Future increases in the effective cost of fuel could have significant long-term 
social and economic consequences, and could increase the rate at which commercial 
aviation adopts fuel-efficient technologies that reduce carbon emissions. In this section, 
behaviour observed in the case study time periods is extrapolated to discuss potential 
future trends in the US air transportation system and their potential consequences. 
 
Factors Influencing the Effective Cost of Fuel 
Two scenarios would result in increased effective fuel costs for commercial 
aviation: (1) government policy, and (2) crude oil markets.  
 
Government Policy 
 International accords or national governments may act to curtail carbon emissions 
by instituting emission taxes or cap and trade policies. This would increase direct 
operating costs associated with fuel burn through the need to purchase offsets on carbon 
exchanges or pay increased fuel taxes. It is expected that such measures would be phased 
in over a number of years, providing an adjustment period, and would not lead to a 
similar spike in fuel costs as experienced during the fuel price surge.  
 The American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454 (commonly referred to 
as the Waxman-Markey Climate and Energy Bill) passed the United States’ House of 
Representatives in July 2009, but did not become law. The EPA (2009) estimated a 
permit to emit one ton of carbon dioxide would be worth $11-$15 in 2012, increasing to 
$22-$28 in 2025 under Waxman-Markey (2005 US$). Assuming a system fuel intensity 
of 0.016 gallons/ASM, emission permits would result in increased unit costs in the range 
0.2-0.5¢/ASM for airlines, representing 8-21% of the unit cost increase that occurred Q3 
2007-08. This cost increase is significant and would be in addition to the cost of any 
increase in market prices for crude oil. Secondary effects of carbon pricing policies 
through the broader economy would further reduce demand for air transport. 
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Crude Oil Markets 
 International markets may continue to provide high volatility in the price of crude 
oil and jet fuel. Under peak oil scenarios, the worldwide supply of oil would decrease, 
resulting in increasing fuel costs if demand for oil does not slacken. Without economical, 
technologically mature, and safety certified energy substitutes, commercial aviation 
would continue to rely on oil derived jet fuel at increased prices. EIA’s Annual Energy 
Outlook (2010) reference case forecasts jet fuel prices to reach $2.93/gallon by 2020 and 
$3.58/gallon by 2035 (2008 US$) as shown in Figure 19. The low/high oil price case 
provides forecasts depending on more optimistic/pessimistic assumptions for economic 
access to non-OPEC resources and for OPEC behaviour. In the high oil price case, jet 
fuel is forecasted to climb to $4.72/gallon by 2020 and $5.33/gallon (2008 US$) by 2035. 
It is likely that jet fuel prices will remain volatile and events similar to the fuel price 
surge examined in this paper may be repeated.  
 
Figure 19. Jet Fuel Price Forecast. Data Source: ATA, 2010; EIA, 2010  
 
 Increased oil-based fuel costs would create an incentive to transition to long-term 
purchase agreements of alternative fuels and to reduce fuel burn through the 
implementation of efficiency measures in aircraft design, operations, and air 
transportation networks. 
 
Fuel Efficiency Measures 
In order to reduce the effects of increasing effective fuel costs, airlines can adopt 
fuel efficiency improvements using a portfolio of measures that include technology 
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improvements, operation optimizations, and alternative fuels (Sgouridis, Bonnefoy, and 
Hansman, 2010). Engine and aerodynamic efficiency have historically improved at 
average rates of 1.5% and 0.4% per year, respectively (Lee et. al., 2001). This trend in 
operational data continued in the past decade, as shown in Figure 20. US domestic 
passenger carrier fuel intensity decreased an average of 1.6%/year 2000-2009, as 
calculated by fuel issued and ASM reported on BTS Form 41 Schedule T2. 
 
Figure 20. US Passenger Carrier Domestic Operations Fuel Intensity, 2000-09. 
Data Source: BTS Form 41 T2, 2010b. 
 
Aircraft require long research and development times and the turnover time for 
the global aviation fleet is approximately 20-25 years. It is unlikely that efficiency 
improvement rates will increase dramatically fleet wide in the near future. In the short-
term, new operational procedures may reduce fuel burn, although infrastructure changes 
have significant lead times (Lee et. al., 2009). Fuel efficiency measures are unlikely to 
buffer airlines from volatility in crude oil prices and increases in the effective cost of fuel, 
motivating the need to understand how air transportation systems will adapt and what the 
potential social and economic consequences are from increases in the effective cost of 
fuel. In the long term, the introduction of new, more fuel efficient aircraft will reduce the 
economic impacts of effective fuel cost increase and enable aviation to transition to 
higher fuel costs. 
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Social and Economic Impacts of Reductions in Air Service 
Goetz and Sutton (1997) used a core-periphery structure to explain the geographic 
effects of deregulation on the airline industry from 1978-1993. Their findings showed 
that core centers (the large hubs and international gateways, such as Chicago, Atlanta and 
New York) benefited more than the periphery spoke cities from increased air 
transportation employment, frequency of service, passenger flow, and lower fares, except 
where one or two airlines dominated a hub. If the observed impacts of the fuel price surge 
were to become permanent, lasting social and economic effects could occur, continuing 
the geographic trends of deregulation. 
 Airports provide numerous benefits to their region of service, including: reduced 
travel time and cost, enable businesses and healthcare procedures requiring time sensitive 
shipments, civil defense, stimulation of regional business, access to the national airport 
system, and recreation. Economic impacts are described as direct, indirect, induced, and 
catalytic. The direct and indirect regional economic impacts of airports can be estimated 
using FAA guidelines. These impacts scale with the number of commercial passengers 
and airport-based aircraft. In 1992, Butler and Kiernan estimated an airport with 50 based 
aircraft induced an annual benefit of $615,500 and provided annual payroll of $304,500, 
while an airport with 50 based aircraft and 50,000 annual commercial customers induced 
$1,672,500 of annual benefit and $1,827,000 of annual payroll (1992 US$). Reductions 
in service and the accompanying passenger traffic to small airports could limit the 
financial viability of many airports, depriving inhabitants in the airport’s catchment area 
of these benefits. 
 Malina, Schwab and Wollersheim (2007) used a contingent valuation approach 
for a secondary airport in Germany and its catchment area to quantify the catalytic effect 
for regional economies that are induced by airports. Their study provided insights as to 
which industries benefit the most from the airport and the value companies place on 
airports. Ishutkina and Hansman (2008) described the interaction between air 
transportation and economic activity in regions throughout the world. By examining links 
between economic development and air transportation, they showed how different 
regions have developed air transportation systems to generate comparative advantages. 
For example, United Arab Emirates’ has diversified its oil-based economy to include 
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logistics operations, tourist attractions, and the fresh flower industry - which are all 
enabled by air transportation. Jamaica is dependent on air transportation to bring tourists 
to the island whose spending promotes economic growth. If a large number of 
communities in the United States were to lose access to the air transportation system, 
economic opportunities that parallel those experienced at the international level could be 
lost at the local level. This potentiality could warrant government action. 
3.4 Policies to Reduce Social and Economic Impacts 
To ensure small communities maintained a link to the national air transportation 
system, Congress established the Essential Air Service (EAS) program when it passed the 
Airline Deregulation Act in 1978. EAS provides subsidies to airlines for otherwise 
unprofitable routes between communities that had air service prior to deregulation and 
hub airports. A reduction in the financial viability of service to small communities may 
result in increased government subsidies to commercial aviation in attempts to maintain 
regional benefits. Figure 21 shows that continental US EAS subsidies have doubled from 
$79.5 million in 2003 to $163 million in 2010. The largest annual increase occurred 
between 2007 and 2008 when subsidies increased $34.5 million to $131 million. The 
recent trend has been for more communities to require more subsidies as the number of 
continental US communities receiving subsidized service increased 19%, from 90 in 2003 
to 107 in 2010. In July 2007, the population in the catchment areas6 of the communities 
with regular service provided by EAS subsidized routes averaged ~170,000, for a total of 
~6% of the continental US population, based on year 2000 census data. EAS subsidies 
improve access to the national air transportation system for a significant portion of the 
population. Historically, governments have intervened to provide subsidies to 
commercial aviation proceeding calamitous events, such as 9/11. Industry adjustment to 
permanent increases in the effective cost of fuel could result in further government 
subsidies.  
                                                
6Catchment area defined as the area of shortest great circle distance to the airport, as calculated using 
Thiessen polygons in ESRI’s ArcGISTM. 
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Figure 21. EAS Subsidies and Continental US Communities Served 
by EAS. Data Source: Office of Aviation Analysis, 2010. 
 
 In 2008, three EAS carriers serving 37 communities ceased operations. 30 EAS 
communities were temporarily without air service for up to 10 months, and 6 for a longer 
period of time (GAO, 2009). Although the EAS mechanism was able to return service to 
these communities, this prolonged interruption likely resulted in social and economic 
effects. The number of carriers providing EAS service has declined from 34 in February 
1987 to 10 in May 2010. In the event of future shocks to the airline industry it is likely 
that small communities will face interruptions in air service. Changes to the EAS 
mechanism may be required to mitigate negative impacts. 
Nolan, Ritchie, and Rowcroft (2005) examined various schemes to attract air 
service in smaller markets, including: direct subsidies, protected route packages, and 
guaranteed revenue approaches (e.g. airline travel banks). Using a small network 
simulation model, they evaluated each option in terms of social welfare and underlying 
agency costs. They found that using revenue guarantees, as opposed to direct subsidies, 
reduces the agency problems of adverse selection, opportunism and regulatory capture. 
Adverse selection occurs when communities lobbying for regulatory support have an 
inherent interest in overstating their need. Cases in which one or more of the parties 
abrogates the terms of an agreement demonstrate opportunism (e.g. an air carrier refusing 
to provide as many flights as originally promised). Regulatory capture results in the 
politician, the regulator, or the firm capturing the control and benefit of the regulatory 
process at the cost of the community. 
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 GAO (2003) recommended more flexibility to be built into the EAS program, 
including eliminating subsidized service to certain communities that are relatively close 
to other larger airports, providing eligible communities with grants to allow them to tailor 
air service to unique local needs, and allowing carriers to operate smaller aircraft that are 
more suited to local levels of demand. If small communities continue to require subsidies 
to maintain air service, Congress will need to decide what level of access to air service is 
acceptable and what level of subsidies it is willing to provide. In March 2011, future 
funding for EAS was in question. The House version of the FAA Reauthorization and 
Reform Act of 2011 proposed phasing out funding for EAS over four years while the 
Senate version included reduced funding levels (Darson, 2011). Although non-hub 
airports account for 72% of continental US airports with commercial service, they 
account for only 9% of departures, which are generally performed in smaller aircraft over 
shorter stage lengths, resulting in smaller aggregated environmental impacts than large 
jets from large airports. When considering climate change and energy legislation, 
Congress will need to weigh the social and economic benefits of air service in small 
communities against the limited potential for reductions in environmental impacts. 
3.5 Summary 
Using the 2004-08 fuel price surge as a natural experiment, it has been shown that 
connections to non-hub airports serving small communities were most sensitive to 
effective fuel cost increases. It was found that non-hub airports lost 12% of connections, 
compared to an average loss of 2.8%, July 2004-08. The complete loss of service July 
2007-08 at 70 non-hub airports, representing 14% of continental US airports with 
commercial service, resulted in an average driving time of 75 minutes to the next nearest 
airport with service for passengers relying on airports no longer with service. It is 
believed that reduced access to the national air transportation system had social and 
economic effects for small communities. The cessation of operations of Air Midwest and 
Big Sky Airlines, the sole carriers serving 20 communities in July 2007, resulted in much 
of the volatility in airports with service 2007-08. Regional and commuter airlines were 
less able to handle fuel cost volatility during this period as ten declared bankruptcy. To 
maintain historic levels of access to the air transportation system, funding for EAS 
subsidized routes has doubled since 2003 while the number of continental US 
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communities serviced by subsidized routes has increased 19% to 107 in 2010. Even 
though subsidies have increased, 36 airports were without service for 10 months or longer 
following the 2008 fuel price surge. If small communities continue to require increasing 
subsidies to maintain air service, Congress will need to decide what level of access to air 
service is acceptable, what level of subsidies it is willing to provide, and how flexibility 
can be designed into programs to reduce interruptions in air service to small communities 
in the future. 
Increases in the effective cost of aviation fuel could result from escalating crude 
oil prices and environmental driven costs (i.e. from cap and trade schemes or taxes). 
Complementary analyses of aircraft fuel efficiency, airline economics, and airfares 
provided a basis for understanding some airline decisions during the fuel price surge that 
can be extrapolated to examine future trends. Increased effective fuel costs will provide 
incentives for airlines to improve fleet fuel efficiency, reducing the environmental effects 
of aviation, but may cause an uneven distribution of social and economic impacts as 
airline networks adapt. As fuel costs increased 2004-08, use of aging, fuel inefficient 
aircraft was reduced while the number of operating turboprops increased. Permanent 
effective fuel cost increase will likely lead to increased adoption rates of CO2 mitigating 
measures which reduce fuel burn, such as aircraft technology innovations, optimized 
operational procedures, and network changes. Benefits due to reductions in the 
environmental impacts of aviation may be balanced by social and economic costs. 
Government action may be required to determine acceptable levels of access to service as 
the air transportation system transitions to higher fuel costs. 
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CHAPTER 4 
4.0 Improving Fleet Fuel Efficiency Through 
Technology Innovation 
 
 
 In the short- and medium-term, increases in effective fuel costs are expected to 
result in higher direct operating costs and airfares, as well as reductions in air service to 
markets no longer economical to serve. In the long-term, fleet fuel efficiency can be 
improved by replacing old aircraft with fuel-efficient aircraft, reducing the negative 
social and economic impacts of increased effective fuel costs. Fuel efficiency 
improvements counteract increasing fuel costs and reduce the environmental impact of 
aviation. But innovation takes time and aircraft are long-lived assets, resulting in a slow 
diffusion of new technologies into the fleet. Further, before a new technology is 
implemented in an aircraft, manufacturers must have the economic incentives to 
innovate.  
In this chapter, historical and projected future aircraft fuel intensity improvements 
are reviewed and the dynamics of fleet turnover are discussed. The structure of the single 
aisle aircraft market is outlined and the competitive game between manufacturers is 
introduced. Two key elements are required to perform the game theory analysis of 
aircraft manufacturer competition in Chapter 6: (1) an understanding of the structure of 
the game, and (2) an estimation of strategy payoffs. This chapter describes the structure 
of the game while Chapter 5 introduces an aircraft program valuation model used to 
estimate the payoffs to manufacturers. 
4.1 Historical Aircraft Fuel Intensity Improvements 
The Breguet range equation can be adapted to demonstrate the levers available to 
reduce aircraft fuel burn and CO2 emissions, as shown in Equation 1 (Kar, 2010; adapted 
from Lee et. al., 2001): 
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Kerosene based jet fuel is currently the only safety certified fuel available in sufficient 
quantities. It has a CO2 content of 3.15 kg CO2/kg fuel. The use of alternative jet fuels 
with lower fossil carbon contents may result in CO2 emission reductions, but to reduce 
the amount of fuel burned, the available levers are (Kar, 2010): 
• Weight - reduce the aircraft’s empty weight and the payload mass. 
• Engine Efficiency – reduce the specific fuel consumption by improving the 
engine efficiency, such as through higher bypass ratios. 
• Aerodynamics - increase the lift to drag ratio. 
• Average Load Factor – fill flights with more passengers and cargo. 
• Fleet Mix - use larger aircraft that take advantage of scale economies to be more 
efficient on a seat-mile or ton-mile basis.  
• Flight Distance – modify network topology to reduce connections and improve 
air traffic control procedures to reduce flight distances. 
• Cruise Speed – operate at cruise speeds that minimize fuel burn. 
 
The IPCC (1999) used Figure 22 to demonstrate that jet aircraft fuel efficiency 
has improved over time, with current aircraft burning 70% less fuel per seat mile than 
early jets. About 40% of the improvement has come from engine efficiency 
improvements and 30% from airframe efficiency improvements.  
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Figure 22. Trend in Transport Aircraft Fuel Efficiency. de Havilland Comet 4 Base Aircraft. 
Source: IPCC, 1999. 
 
 Successive generations of engine technologies have led to reductions in specific 
fuel consumption, as shown in Figure 23. 
 
 
Figure 23. Reduction in Fuel Consumption and CO2 Emissions by Engine Technology. 
Source: Ferreri, 2003. 
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Lee et. al. (2001) used BTS operational data to compare historic trends in the 
energy intensity of aircraft per available seat kilometre (ASK). Extrapolating the historic 
trends, they project energy intensity to decline at an expected rate of 1.2%-2.2% per year, 
as shown in Figure 24: 
 
Figure 24. Future Aircraft Energy Usage. Source: Lee et. al., 2001. 
 
Using operational data, Babikian et. al. (2002) demonstrated that regional aircraft 
are 40-60% less fuel efficient than narrow- and wide-body aircraft, and that regional jets 
are 10-60% less fuel efficient than turboprops, as shown in Figure 25. The disparities in 
fuel efficiency were largely explained by differences in operations as opposed to 
technology levels. Regional aircraft operate with lower load factors and perform fewer 
miles over which to spread the fixed costs of taxiing, takeoff and climb. To improve fleet 
fuel efficiency, it is not enough to improve technology in only the largest wide body 
aircraft. Operations and technology levels in narrow body and regional jets must also 
improve. 
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Figure 25. Energy Intensity of Regional Aircraft Compared to Fleet Averages and Large Aircraft 
Source: Babikian et. al., 2002. 
 
Peeters and Hoolhorst (2005) showed that the last piston-powered aircraft were as 
fuel efficient as the current average jet. They noted that defining future cuts in energy 
consumption in terms of a constant annual percentage reduction ignores the fact that 
energy consumption will never reach zero. The annual rate of reduction in fuel intensity 
is slowing, making studies that project historical fuel intensity improvements into the 
future optimistic. Historically, fuel efficiency has not been the primary objective of 
commercial aircraft designers. Jets replaced piston airliners. The A380 was designed with 
an 11% increase in fuel burn over optimal to conform to the airport handling constraint of 
an 80m wingspan. Peeters and Hoolhorst claimed that a power curve is a more faithful fit 
to historic data than an annual percent reduction. As shown in Figure 26, they used the 
power curve model in equation 2 to fit historical improvements in aircraft energy 
intensity, Ei,: 
        Equation 2 
 
where a and b are constants while n is the number of years from the base year. 
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Figure 26. Aircraft Fuel Efficiency Trends and Projections. Source: Peeters and Hoolhurst, 2005. 
 
 Using sales-weighted average aircraft fuel burn, Rutherford and Zeinali (2009) 
demonstrated that the average aircraft fuel efficiency has improved by only ~50% since 
the first jets, while efficiency gains have slowed to 0.0% since 2000, as shown in Figure 
27. The reduction in annual efficiency gains is correlated with low fuel prices from 1987 
to 2004 and a tripling in the average age of aircraft and engine manufacturer production 
lines since 1989. Rutherford and Zeinali conclude that fuel costs have not been sufficient 
to stimulate increased aircraft efficiency, suggesting that a CO2 standard applying to 
newly built aircraft is more likely to reduce emissions. But the 1980s marked a period of 
fierce competition between manufacturers and rapid fleet fuel efficiency improvements. 
Therefore, We hypothesize that competition between aircraft and engine manufacturers is 
a key driver of innovation resulting in fuel efficiency improvements. 
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Figure 27. Sales-Weighted Average Jet Aircraft Fuel Burn, 1960-2008.  
Source: Rutherford and Zeinali, 2009. 
 
4.2 Future Potential Fuel Intensity Improvements 
Tube and wing designs have dominated commercial aircraft since the 1950s, 
while engine technology innovations have led to three product cycles during the jet era, 
as shown in Figure 28. 
 
 
Figure 28. Life Cycles and Replacement of Jet Aircraft Class Product. Source: Ferreri, 2003. 
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Dominant designs emerge from a process of experimentation and competition 
within a product class. As a synthesis of a number of proven concepts, the dominant 
design becomes locked-in to future designs and consumer expectations. Tushman and 
Anderson (1986) wrote:  
…technology evolves through periods of incremental change punctuated by technological 
breakthroughs that either enhance or destroy the competence of firms in an industry. 
These breakthroughs, or technological discontinuities, significantly increase both 
environmental uncertainty and munificence….while competence-destroying 
discontinuities are initiated by new firms and are associated with increased environmental 
turbulence, competence-enhancing discontinuities are initiated by existing firms and are 
associated with decreased environmental turbulence. These effects decrease over 
successive discontinuities. Those firms that initiate major technological changes grow 
more rapidly than other firms. 
 
In the next jet aircraft product cycle, incumbent manufacturers have an 
opportunity to innovate. By building on their past successes and implementing 
technology innovations in new designs, incumbents can raise entrance barriers and 
prevent increased competition. If they choose not to innovate, incumbent manufacturers 
may lose their technological superiority and significant market share to new entrants. 
Although fuel efficiency is not the sole aircraft design criteria, with the expectation of 
increasing fuel costs and pressure to reduce aviation’s environmental impacts it is likely 
that fuel efficiency will increasingly be the critically important design criterion. While 
safety will always be aviation’s primary concern, it is probable that the next 
discontinuous aircraft design change will be a step improvement in fuel efficiency. 
 NASA’s Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) project aims to assess 
vehicle concepts and enabling technologies that have the potential to mitigate aviation’s 
impact on the environment. Table 6 outlines the project’s goals for subsonic vehicles.  
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Table 6. NASA’s Environmentally Responsible Aviation (ERA) Project Goals for Subsonic Vehicles 
“N” - the current generation of commercial aircraft. “N+1” - the next generation, and so forth. 
 
In the first stage of the NASA ERA project, MIT, Boeing, GE Aviation, and 
Northrop Grumman developed conceptual designs for N+3 vehicles. MIT developed two 
designs that met the NASA goals:  (1) a double-bubble, and (2) a hybrid wing body. The 
D8 Series double-bubble was a 180-seat advanced tube and wing design that could fulfill 
the current role of Boeing’s 737-800. It incorporated a lifting nose, embedded aft engines, 
and a reduced operational Mach number allowing for nearly unswept wings. The H3 
Series was a more radical 350-seat design with a payload and range comparable to 
Boeing’s 777-200LR. As a triangular-shaped hybrid wing body aircraft, the H3 blended a 
wider fuselage with the wings for improved aerodynamics. The center body created lift, 
eliminating the need for a tail to balance the aircraft (Greitzer et. al., 2010). Non-
traditional aircraft designs would be a risky and costly project for a private firm to 
undertake. New technologies need to be developed, manufactured, tested, and safety 
certified. This creates significant financial and technical barriers to implementation of 
such discontinuous technologies. 
  Kar (2010) demonstrated that there are a number of technologies at various stages 
of technology readiness that have the potential to reduce fuel burn. In the near-term, new 
engine technologies, aerodynamic improvements, and weight reduction opportunities 
exist that could result in substantial fuel burn improvements in retrofitted or new aircraft. 
In the long-term, fuel burn reduction potential is even greater. Table 7 outlines a selection 
of the technologies identified. 
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Table 7. Selection of Technologies to Improve Fuel Efficiency.  
Source: Kar, 2010. 
 Near-Term  
<5 years 
Long-Term  
>5 years 
Propulsion High bypass ratio engines Open rotor engines 
 Geared turbofan engines  
Aerodynamics Winglets Hybrid laminar flow 
 Riblets High aspect ratio wings 
 Laminar nacelles  
Weight Composites  
 Reduced OEW  
 
Figure 29 shows a temporal representation of the 41 CO2 mitigating measures identified 
by Kar (2010). The amount of time required to reach market saturation is called the 
diffusion time while the start time represents the estimate of the measure’s year of entry 
into service. The area of each bubble represents the percent potential CO2 emissions 
reduction. 
 
Figure 29. Distribution of Mitigating Measures’ Start and Diffusion Times. Source: Kar, 2010. 
 
While it is likely that technologies either do, or will, exist to substantially reduce 
aircraft fuel burn, they will only be implemented if they are economically feasible. 
Retrofitting in-service aircraft with non-safety required equipment has generally not 
proven economical. Updating technologies on current in-production aircraft leads to 
incremental fuel efficiency improvements, but engineers are constrained by previous 
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design choices that limit the achievable improvements. Clean sheet design aircraft offer 
the most flexibility in implementing fuel burn reducing technologies, but the long time 
constants associated with aviation result in decades between new designs for a market 
segment. These factors reduce the effectiveness of innovation at improving fleet fuel 
efficiency. 
4.3 Economics and Dynamics of Implementation of Mitigating Measures 
Before a fuel efficiency measure is implemented, it must be economically 
feasible. Morris et. al. (2009) developed a framework to estimate the marginal abatement 
costs (MAC) for CO2 and other emissions from the aviation sector, as shown in Figure 
30. Measures with a negative abatement cost are financially beneficial to implement 
while those with a positive abatement cost are only cost effective if fuel prices rise above 
expectations or a carbon price is imposed. The horizontal axis shows the estimated 
magnitude of European fleet CO2 reductions in 2012 for each measure. 
 
Figure 30. CO2 Marginal Abatement Cost Curve for the 2012 European Fleet, Base Case Fuel Prices. 
Source: Morris et. al., 2009. 
 
Better use of capacity, reducing fuel reserves, and light-weighting aircraft were estimated 
to be the most cost effective mitigating measures, while early aircraft retirements and 
engine upgrades are expected to have the highest abatement costs. It is economically 
efficient to implement those measures with the lowest abatement costs first, progressing 
up the MAC curve until the marginal abatement cost is positive. 
 Although early retirement of aircraft may not be an economically efficient means 
of reducing fuel burn, the natural process of fleet turnover is. As older aircraft in the fleet 
are retired and replaced by current in-production aircraft, the fleet fuel efficiency 
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improves. But, if in-production aircraft technology levels remain constant, operating fleet 
fuel efficiency improvements slow as all aircraft in the fleet approach the same 
technology level. Kar (2010) found that the early adoption of available technology, as 
opposed to waiting and delaying entry for more fuel-efficient technologies, has a greater 
potential to improve fleet fuel efficiency by 2050. With operating lifetimes of 20-25 
years, significant changes to the average fleet fuel efficiency require a combination of 
step improvements in the fuel burn of new models and an acceleration of adoption of new 
models. 
Morrell and Dray (2009) analyzed fleet turnover and the incorporation of new 
technologies. They found that airline purchase decisions have historically not been 
affected by fuel prices when the selection of aircraft types available remains constant. 
However, the mean fuel burn of new aircraft orders is strongly affected by the 
introduction of new aircraft models with significantly lower fuel burn.  This finding 
suggests that influencing the rate of technology development may be an effective policy 
lever for reducing emissions via fleet turnover. Single aisle aircraft currently make up 
61% of the world’s jet fleet and 68% of 2010-29 forecasted deliveries (Boeing, 2010a). 
As the largest lever, the single aisle market was investigated to determine what factors 
and policies might lead to the introduction of new aircraft models with step 
improvements in fuel efficiency. 
4.4 Single Aisle Aircraft Market Structure 
As an industry with economies of scale that requires large capital investments, 
high technical capabilities, and a worldwide service network, large commercial aircraft 
manufacturing is naturally concentrated to a small number of competitors (Busch, 2001). 
The 100+ seat commercial market has historically been split between the American 
manufacturers (Boeing, McDonnell-Douglas, and Lockheed) and the European Airbus 
consortium, as shown in Figure 31. 
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Figure 31. Large Commercial Aircraft Manufacturer Market Shares by 100+  
Seat Jetliner Deliveries, 1960-2009. Date Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b. 
 
Since Boeing’s purchase of McDonnell-Douglas in 1997, Airbus and Boeing have 
competed in a global duopoly. Large barriers to entry exist which protect the incumbents 
from new competition. The cost of developing a new aircraft ranges from estimates of $3 
to $14 billion (depending on the aircraft size and technology level) and requires expertise 
only developed over long periods of time. Production learning effects result in unit costs 
dropping on the order of 20% every time the quantity produced doubles, creating 
significant unit cost advantages for aircraft with long production runs (Benkard, 2000). 
Further, airlines purchasing new aircraft demand low operating costs and competitive 
pricing. Fleet commonality reduces operating and maintenance costs, as well as spare part 
inventories, providing incentives for airlines to lock-in to one aircraft family. In order to 
maintain market share in a segment, manufacturers are forced to develop aircraft with 
essentially equivalent performance. To gain market share, significant performance 
improvements are required to overcome the switching costs of airlines locked-in to one 
product family. 
Boeing and Airbus compete in market segments defined by the aircraft’s range 
and seating capacity, which vary from 2000 to 8000+ miles and 100 to 500+ seats. 
Narrow body aircraft serve short- and medium-haul routes while wide body aircraft 
generally serve cross- and inter-continental routes. Both companies recently updated their 
large wide bodies with the introduction of Airbus’s A380 in 2007 and the expected first 
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delivery of Boeing’s 747-8 in 2011. In the medium wide body market segment, the 
manufacturers are entering a battle between Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner and Airbus’s larger 
A350 XWB, with first deliveries expected in 2011 and 2013, respectively. Manufacturers 
generally respond to each other’s moves to prevent an inferior aircraft in a market 
segment from losing market share and profit potential. As both manufacturers have a 
complete product line and have performed significant updates to their wide body aircraft 
families, the next area of competition is likely the narrow body, single aisle segment - 
Boeing’s 737 and Airbus’s A320 families. 
Boeing’s 737 first entered service in 1968. A variety of derivative aircraft based 
on the initial design, with different ranges and seating capacities, have been produced 
over the years. Members of the Next Generation 737 family were launched in the late 
1990s and early 2000s with updated engines, cabin interiors, and flight deck avionics as 
well as winglets and changes to the airframe. Airbus entered its A320 family into service 
in 1988. The aircraft’s fuselage has been stretched and shrunken to fill different market 
niches with the introduction of the A321, A319, and A318. A variety of engines have 
been used on the Airbus airplanes allowing for incremental improvements in fuel 
efficiency. Figure 32 shows a timeline of upgrades performed to both manufacturers’ 
single aisle product lines over the past 30 years. 
 
Figure 32. Narrow Body Single-Aisle Jet Aircraft, 1980-2010. Source: Boeing, 2010c. 
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 If one manufacturer develops a superior aircraft, its competitors risk losing market 
share, as shown in Figure 33. In the 150-185 seat single aisle short- to medium-range 
market segment, Boeing’s 727-200 enjoyed a monopoly until the MD-80 entered service 
in 1980 with an estimated 37% fuel burn improvement at the R1 range7 (not shown in the 
figure). Boeing’s 737-400 and Airbus’s A320 entered service in 1988, offering 
significant performance improvements over the MD-80. McDonnell Douglas exited the 
market in 1997 leaving the two remaining manufacturers to split the market. Since the 
late 1990s when Boeing introduced the 737-800 and 737-900, the manufacturers have 
performed incremental improvements on their existing product lines.  
 
Figure 33. Single Aisle, 150-185 Seat Market Shares and Fuel burn Performance, 1980-2009. 
Data Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b; Piano-X. 
 
 New competition in the single aisle markets may be on the horizon. Figure 34 
demonstrates that while only a few firms enjoy the technical competency, financial 
resources, and market control that allow them to carry on the development of an aircraft 
program in all phases, the number of competitors expands moving down the productive 
pyramid (Ferreri, 2003). As regional aircraft manufacturers and major structure sharing 
suppliers develop design and production capabilities, they may decide to compete with 
the incumbents in the large commercial aircraft market segments (Bediér et. al., 2008). 
Embraer’s E195 encroaches on the 100+ seat market while Bombardier’s CSeries is due 
                                                
7 R1 range is the maximum aircraft range after which payload must be sacrificed to gain additional range. 
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to enter service in 2013 with 100-145 seat variants. Commercial Aircraft Corporation of 
China (Comac) is planning to introduce its 168-190 seat C919 in 2016 while Russia’s 
Irkut is developing the 150-210 seat MC-21 family for entry into service in 2015-16. 
While the performance of these new aircraft is uncertain, if new entrants are able to gain 
market share, Airbus and Boeing may decide to update their single aisle fleet - creating 
opportunities to reduce the environmental impacts of aviation. 
 
Figure 34. The Productive Pyramid in the Civil Aeronautic Industry. Source: Ferreri, 2003. 
 
 A potential strategy for incumbent manufacturers is to re-engine their existing 
airframes, taking advantage of recent breakthroughs in propulsion technologies to 
improve aircraft performance. Due to past design decisions, Boeing’s 737-800 sits lower 
to the ground than the A320. Fully loaded, the engine ground clearance on the 737-800 is 
only 19” (Boeing, 2005). The 737’s current CFM56-7 engines have an inlet diameter of 
61” while next generation high bypass ratio and geared turbofan (GTF) engines will have 
larger diameters (e.g. 81” for Pratt & Whitney’s PW1100G) and will be heavier. 
Therefore, Boeing’s 737 requires additional engineering work to re-engine than Airbus’s 
A320. This provides a re-engining advantage to Airbus as a smaller investment and less 
technical risk is required. 
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4.5 Structure of the Competitive Game 
Game theory frameworks have been used in the past to analyze competition 
between aircraft manufacturers. Brander and Spencer (1985) showed how government 
subsidies could be used to change the initial conditions of games between non-
cooperative international rivals. Krugman (1987) used hypothetical payoff matrices to 
show how government subsidies could enable domestic firms to increase profits in excess 
of the subsidy amounts by deterring foreign entry and allowing domestic firms to capture 
excess returns, increasing social welfare. A game theory analysis enables the discovery of 
the Nash equilibrium of multiple, competing players’ who all act in their own best 
interests. Understanding how competition impacts the decision to invest in new aircraft 
designs can assist policy makers in developing plans of action to improve aviation’s fuel 
efficiency. 
As both Boeing and Airbus have existing in-production single aisle aircraft, the 
game has been altered since the economists analyzed it in the 1980s. Incumbent 
manufacturers have four generic strategies: (1) maintain their existing product lines, with 
incremental improvements over time, (2) re-engine their existing airframes, providing 
superior performance improvement, (3) develop new, clean sheet design aircraft that offer 
the greatest fuel burn improvements, or (4) exit the market. Based on historical data, 
incremental improvements to an aircraft generally amount to ~1%/annual fuel intensity 
reductions. Re-engining Airbus’s A320 or Boeing 737-800 is expected to offer up to 15% 
fuel savings (Airbus, 2010a). A new aircraft with a clean sheet design would offer a fuel 
efficiency improvement on the order of 25% (ACARE, 2008; Morrell and Dray, 2009).  
As technologies mature, clean sheet design aircraft in the future will offer greater 
efficiency, with expected improvements on the order of 70% by 2040 (Kar, 2010). 
NASA’s ERA goals include developing technologies that will enable 70% or better fuel 
burn performance on clean sheet design aircraft by 2025. Therefore, in the long term, 
there is a performance advantage to delay the design of a new aircraft. Due to payback 
periods on the order of 10-15 years for large commercial aircraft programs, when a 
manufacturer commits to a new aircraft, they lock-in to the technology level for the 
duration of the program, enabling only incremental improvements. Figure 35 shows that 
if Manufacturer A decides to re-engine in 2010, the aircraft is expected to enter service 
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around 2015, providing a performance advantage over Manufacturer B’s product. But, if 
Manufacturer B decides to develop a new aircraft around 2015, they would gain the 
performance advantage when it enters service around 2020. Locking into a technology 
may leave a competitor vulnerable to their aircraft being obsolete five or ten years later - 
around the same time manufacturers hope for their programs to become profitable and 
benefit from reduced production unit costs through learning effects. Aircraft that have 
superior performance gain market share and yield higher sale prices. Although 
manufacturers can always purchase market share by dropping sale price, this strategy 
reduces profit margins. 
 
Figure 35. Potential Fuel Burn Improvements of Future Technologies. 
 
Uncertainties in future demand and fuel prices impact the expected value of an 
aircraft program. The demand for new aircraft is dependent on the profitability of airlines 
and is therefore volatile, impacted by GDP growth, macroeconomic cycles, and passenger 
preferences (Sgouridis, 2007). Manufacturers must build production facilities and supply 
chains with the flexibility to meet expected demand. Optimistic forecasts expose the 
manufacturer to downside risks that may result in severe financial consequences while 
overly pessimistic forecasts limit the potential upside of the program. Operating cost 
savings is a major selling point of new aircraft programs, but the magnitude of operating 
cost savings is partially dependent on future fuel prices. Fuel prices are volatile, resulting 
in uncertainty in the value of efficiency improvements and prices manufacturers can 
obtain for increased aircraft technology levels. 
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In Chapter 6, two types of games are analyzed: (1) static games in which the 
manufacturer’s decision space is limited to maintaining their product lines, re-engining 
their current aircraft, or developing a new aircraft, and (2) dynamic games in which 
manufacturers update their decisions at 5-year increments, based on the evolution of fuel 
prices and demand for single aisle aircraft. Figure 36 outlines the decision space in both 
types of games. It is assumed that there is a 5-year delay from when a decision is made to 
when the aircraft enters service. Therefore, a decision to develop a new aircraft includes 
the production and sale of the existing aircraft for 5-years until the new aircraft enters 
service. In the dynamic game, it is assumed that a manufacturer would produce a re-
engined aircraft for 10-years to receive a sufficient payback on their investment. In each 
case, it is assumed that a player’s moves in the game terminate when they decide to 
develop a new aircraft. A 20-year period is used for the static games to correspond to the 
manufacturer demand forecasts and oil price forecasts while a 30-year period is used for 
the dynamic games to enable a sufficient payback period for new aircraft introduced in 
later stages.  
 
 
Figure 36. Structure of the Static and Dynamic Games Analyzed. 
 
4.6 Summary 
Chapter 4 reviewed historical improvements in aircraft fuel efficiency. Fleet wide 
fuel efficiency improvements will only be obtained by the introduction of new single 
aisle aircraft with step performance improvements. New technologies have the potential 
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to create a discontinuity in the product cycle that offers opportunities for new entrants to 
compete or incumbents to solidify their hold on the market. Aviation’s marginal 
abatement cost (MAC) curve was introduced, demonstrating that although the natural 
process of fleet turnover has a long time constant, it is an economically efficient approach 
to improving fleet fuel efficiency. Before new aircraft offering step fuel efficiency 
improvements are produced, manufacturers must have the incentives to innovate. The 
history of competition in the single aisle market segment was reviewed to understand the 
structure of the game that manufacturers are faced with in their current decisions to 
maintain, re-engine, or develop a new single aisle aircraft. Before proceeding with the 
static and dynamic game analyses, an aircraft program valuation model is introduced in 
Chapter 5 that will be used to estimate the manufacturers’ payoffs for the game theory 
analysis in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 5 
5.0 Methodology for Aircraft Program Valuation 
 
  
 A game theory analysis is rooted in determining: (1) the structure of the game, 
and (2) the payoffs to each player. The structure of the game was outlined in Chapter 4 
using a historical analysis of aircraft fuel efficiency improvements and manufacturer 
competition in the single aisle aircraft market. This chapter develops an aircraft program 
valuation model to estimate the payoffs for the manufacturers’ strategies under varying 
market conditions. Following the principle of Occam’s razor, a simple model is 
constructed to avoid unnecessary complexity, improving our ability to understand its 
behaviour. Aircraft manufacturers keep much of their production and sales financial data 
proprietary to protect competitive interests. Therefore, there is uncertainty in the model’s 
input parameters. The purpose of this aircraft program valuation model is to determine 
the correct rank ordering of manufacturers’ generic strategy payoffs in expected value 
terms under the different scenarios investigated in Chapter 6. We make no assertions 
concerning the validity of the absolute value of payoffs estimated, but only their rank 
ordering. An organization with access to more complete financial data could develop an 
improved valuation model and use the framework of analysis developed in Chapters 4 
and 6 to yield more accurate cardinal estimates of the manufacturer payoffs.  
 How manufacturers make the business case for new aircraft programs is discussed 
in Section 5.1. The aircraft program valuation model is developed in Section 5.2. A 
sensitivity analysis is conducted in Section 5.3 to determine whether the aircraft program 
valuation model is robust and how altering the model’s input parameters impact the rank 
ordering of payoffs. The chapter is summarized in Section 5.4. 
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5.1 Making the Case for New Aircraft Programs 
Successful aircraft programs require longevity to achieve efficient production 
volumes in the face of constantly changing market conditions, competitive actions, and 
technological alternatives. Steiner (1982) listed the key drivers for program decisions as: 
market needs and timing, government actions and priorities, competitor actions, 
technology readiness, and fiscal considerations. Often decisions made become 
irreversible due to program cost penalties. Therefore, it is critical to make decisions that 
will yield the highest payoff, given all technical, political, and economic variables in the 
problem, as well as their associated uncertainty.  
Previous works highlight the need to consider more than just the technical aspects 
of an aircraft program when making product line decisions. Mavris and Birney (2002) 
outlined the need to link the engineering and business sides of a program to provide 
decision-makers with a clearer understanding of payoffs and risk. Markish (2002) 
developed an aircraft program valuation model that combined a performance model, a 
development and manufacturing cost model, and a revenue model with a dynamic 
programming algorithm to account for uncertainty in future market conditions, 
demonstrating the usefulness of design based on maximum value to the aircraft 
manufacturer. Peoples (2004) used a multidisciplinary design optimization (MDO) 
approach to assess aircraft performance, finances, and business risk in aircraft program 
design. Justin et. al. (2010) are working towards a game-theoretic and real-options based 
method that will optimize research and development strategies and properly value large 
development projects. The aircraft program valuation model developed in this report 
estimates the financial payoffs of aircraft programs to incorporate strategic factors into 
aircraft program decisions using game theory. Further work is needed to integrate 
technical requirements with the financial and strategic aspects of the problem.  
Before deciding to pursue an aircraft program, manufacturers must close the 
business case. The right aircraft must target the broadest market segment and rely on a 
level of technology that makes production costs reasonable while offering performance 
improvements that competitors will have difficulty exceeding. An aircraft design that 
includes technologies not yet at an appropriate readiness level will lead to excessive 
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program delays and cost overruns while a program not ambitious enough will open 
opportunities for competitors to capture market share by producing a superior product. 
 A number of figures of merit are commonly used to value and compare 
investment options. These include the payback period, internal rate of return (IRR), cost-
benefit ratio, and net present value (NPV). Each metric has drawbacks and benefits. Net 
present value enables cash flows over multiple years to be compared while recognizing 
the time value of money through the selection of a discount rate. Expected net present 
value, E(NPV), incorporates the uncertainty of NPV calculations by taking the 
probability weighted mean of NPV under a range of future scenarios. It is likely that 
manufacturers make aircraft program decisions in expected terms using NPV 
calculations. Therefore, this metric was selected as the manufacturers’ objective functions 
used to calculate payoffs for the game theory analysis in Chapter 6. 
 
5.2 Aircraft Program Valuation Model 
As in Irwin and Pavcnik (2004), the objective function of manufacturers is 
assumed to be the net present value of expected profits: 
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where Et is the expectation operator conditional on information at time t, n is the number 
of periods included in the analysis, δ is the discount factor, qt is the quantity of aircraft 
sold (which is a product of the firm’s market share and total market size), pt is the sale 
price of the aircraft, ct is the variable cost of production, and I is the nonrecurring 
investment required. This objective function is expected for nongovernmental firms 
operating in market economies. Firms operating in different home country market 
structures may choose different objective functions, but this complexity is not examined. 
A symmetric duopoly is assumed in which firm’s are risk neutral and identical, except for 
the investment required to re-engine (as discussed in Section 4.4). The static analysis was 
limited to a 20-year period as manufacturers release 20-year demand forecasts and 
discounting reduces the present value of future cash flows, while the dynamic game was 
extended to a 30-year period to enable manufacturers to book revenues from aircraft that 
enter into service at later stages in the game. The periods of analysis were broken into 
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five-year stages to reduce the number of future states considered, making the problem 
tractable. Forecasted demand and fuel prices represent average values over the course of 
a business cycle. In the following subsections, the objective function in equation 3 is 
expanded and assumptions are outlined. The model input parameters are summarized in 
Table 14. 
 
Nonrecurring Investments 
Aircraft program nonrecurring investments consist of the research, development, 
testing and evaluation (RDT&E) of the aircraft. This includes the design, prototypes, 
flight testing, production facility construction, and tooling that is required to produce the 
first plane that enters commercial service. While this analysis assumes symmetric firms, 
due to past design decisions, Boeing’s 737 requires additional engineering work to re-
engine. Therefore, it was assumed that Player B requires a $3 billion investment to re-
engine its aircraft, while Player A only requires a $1.5 billion investment. New aircraft 
development programs are much more costly, likely in the range of $10 billion for the 
single aisle market (Rothman, 2010). It was assumed that nonrecurring costs are 
distributed over one five-year stage in the model. Although designing and testing a new 
aircraft is a more complex task than re-engining an existing airframe, the model is broken 
into 5-year periods to reduce the number of feasible states explored. Estimates of the 
investment required were taken from industry press, based on historical programs. 
 
Recurring Production Costs 
Recurring costs of manufacturing aircraft are subject to a learning curve that 
incentivizes manufacturers early in a program to produce more, reducing unit production 
costs for the remainder of the program. Raymer (2006) uses the learning curve model: 
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where cqi is the unit production cost of the ith unit produced, c1 is the theoretical first unit 
cost (TFUC), qi is the number of units produced, and β is the learning curve slope.  
The learning curve slope has been estimated to be between 75% and 95%, with 
80% generally accepted based on empirical analysis and expert opinion (Benkard, 2004; 
Irwin and Pavcnik, 2004). The theoretical first unit cost was estimated using the DAPCA 
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IV model, developed by the RAND Corporation using a statistical analysis of past 
commercial and military aircraft programs (Raymer, 2006). The estimated unit cost of the 
100th aircraft produced was used to estimate the theoretical unit cost of the first based on 
the learning curve slope assumption, in the same manner as Markish (2002). 
The initial quantity of units produced for the maintain strategy was estimated 
from historical deliveries. To the end of 2009, Boeing had delivered 1806 737-800s while 
Airbus had delivered 2257 A320s. For the re-engine strategy, it was assumed that the 
manufacturer would benefit from significant learning effects due to a long history of 
producing the air frame, but the learning curve would be reset to some lower number of 
units produced due to the design and production changes required. The initial quantity of 
units produced for the re-engine strategy was set at a level where the estimated unit 
production cost approximated sale price. 
 
Demand Forecast 
Narrow body aircraft deliveries are cyclical, with high volatility, as shown in 
Figure 37: 
 
Figure 37. Narrow Body Deliveries, 1990-2009. Data Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b. 
 
Figure 38 shows that the percentage change in annual deliveries has been volatile over 
the past 20 years, around the mean annual growth rates of 10% for A320s and 5.5% for 
737s. The business cycles in the 1990s led to much more dramatic changes in yearly 
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deliveries than in the 2000s, suggesting that manufacturers have taken steps to reduce the 
classic supply chain bullwhip effect that was present in earlier decades (Sgouridis, 2007, 
p. 322). 
 
Figure 38. Annual Percent Change in 737 and A320 Deliveries, 1990-2009.  
Data Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b. 
 
The global demand for single aisle aircraft was forecasted as average yearly 
deliveries, for each five-year stage, using a recombinant binomial lattice model, as shown 
in Table 8. For each stage of the lattice model, the average demand over the next five-
year stage (i.e. the state, S) was assumed to either increase by amount u or decrease by 
amount d, with probability p or 1-p, respectively. Repeating these calculations for each 
state, in each stage, yielded a cone of possible demand states and the forecasted 
probability of each demand state occurring. The values for u, d, and p were estimated 
from historical delivery data using the formulas (Chance, 2007): 
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where σ is the delivery variance, ν is the expected mean growth rate of deliveries, and Δt 
is the number of periods. The expected deliveries per year for each stage in the lattice 
model was the probability weighted average of the stage’s demand states. This method 
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limited the number of states to explore in the model, but recognized the uncertainty 
inherent in forecasting demand over 20 years. 
The variance was calculated from the 2000-09 deliveries of MD-80/90, Boeing 
737-800/900 and Airbus A320. High and low estimates were calculated using the periods 
1990-2009 and 2005-09. The mean growth rate was calculated so that the expected 
deliveries over the next 20 years equaled the average of the Airbus and Boeing 2010-
2029 single aisle market forecasts. The high and low estimates of the mean growth rate 
were calculated using the two manufacturer’s independent forecasts. Each state of the 
lattice model in Table 8 represents the average expected deliveries over each five-year 
stage in the years indicated. The initial state represents the average deliveries in the 2005-
09 period. 
 
Table 8. Base Case Aircraft Demand Binomial Lattice Model 
  Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
  2005-09 2010-14 2015-19 2020-24 2025-29 
Aircraft Deliveries/Year 391 738 1393 2630 4965 
   207 391 738 1393 
    110 207 391 
     58 110 
      31 
Probability 100% 47% 22% 10% 5% 
   53% 50% 35% 22% 
    28% 40% 37% 
     15% 28% 
      8% 
Expected Deliveries/Year 391 455 530 617 718 
Total Deliveries, 2010-2029  11,599         
 
Jet Fuel Price Forecast 
The expected price of jet fuel influences airlines willingness to invest in fuel burn 
reducing technologies. It was assumed that if fuel prices are expected to escalate, airlines 
will be more willing to invest in new aircraft that reduce fuel burn, as discussed in 
Section 3.3. Therefore, the expected price of fuel influences the prices airlines are willing 
to pay for new aircraft and the amount of risk manufacturers are willing to take to 
implement fuel efficiency technologies in new aircraft. Jet fuel prices were modeled in 
the same manner as the demand for aircraft using a binomial lattice model. The mean 
growth rate was taken from the Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) 2010 Annual 
 74 of 113 
Energy Outlook while the variance was determined from historical jet fuel prices (ATA, 
2010a). High and low estimates were taken from the EIA oil price scenarios. 
 
Table 9. Base Case Jet Fuel Price Binomial Lattice Model 
 Stage 0 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 
 2005-09 2010-14 2015-19 2020-24 2025-29 
Jet Fuel Price/Gallon $2.24 $4.58 $9.35 $19.12 $39.07 
  $1.10 $2.24 $4.58 $9.35 
   $0.54 $1.10 $2.24 
    $0.26 $0.54 
     $0.13 
Probability 100% 42% 18% 7% 3% 
  58% 49% 31% 17% 
   34% 42% 36% 
    20% 33% 
     11% 
Expected Fuel Price $2.24 $2.56 $2.92 $3.33 $3.80 
 
Aircraft Lifecycle Cost Analysis 
 New aircraft often fetch a higher sale price to compensate manufacturers for the 
risk of increased technology levels. From an airline perspective, the benefits of advanced 
technology come from reductions in fuel and maintenance costs over the course of the 
aircraft’s operating life, as shown in Figure 39.  
 
Figure 39. The Benefits of Advanced Technology – Fuel 
Related Cost Savings. Source: Ferreri, 2003. 
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Airline purchase decisions are modeled using an aircraft life cycle cost model. 
The model was developed using assumptions based on Morrell and Dray (2009), updated 
with average BTS (2010) operations and cost data for A320s and 737-800s operated by 
US carriers in the year 2009, as shown in Table 10. The discount rate was selected based 
on an IATA analysis of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for the airline 
industry (Pearce, 2009). The estimated sale price of the aircraft represents 20% of the 
present value of the life cycle costs, as shown in Figure 40. Fuel can account for 33% of 
total aircraft related operating costs (TAROC) using an 8% discount rate, the base fuel 
price scenario, and a 20-year operating lifetime. Although these calculations are 
approximate, they demonstrate that sale price is one component of an airline’s decision to 
purchase an aircraft while lifecycle operating cost is likely a larger share. A manufacturer 
that can reduce operating costs will be able to increase sale price within a range that 
keeps TAROC constant, or reduces it.  
 
Table 10. Aircraft Lifecycle Fuel Cost Model Input Parameters 
Variable  Source 
Block Hours 3658 block hour/year BTS, 2009 
Fuel Burn 792 gallon/block hour 
Fuel Intensity Degradation      Year 1-5: 0% 
     Year 6-10: 0% 
     Year 11-15: 0% 
     Year 16-20: 0.5% 
 
Morrell and Dray, 2009 
Discount Rate 8% Pearce, 2009 
 
 
Figure 40. A320/737-800 Lifecycle Cost Estimates  
Data Source: BTS, 2010; Morrell and Dray, 2009. 
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Aircraft Pricing 
There are strong anecdotal reports of significant discounting in large commercial 
aircraft pricing (Newhouse, 2007; Gittel and O’Reilly, 2001). An analysis of Boeing and 
Airbus Annual Reports (2000-2009) demonstrated that revenues from commercial 
aircraft sales have never matched the list prices of the aircraft delivered in any one year. 
Figure 41 shows Boeing and Airbus’s average list price discounts, as calculated by the 
difference between the manufacturers’ commercial aircraft revenues and the 2008 aircraft 
list prices times the number of deliveries of each aircraft type, in each year. The Airline 
Monitor (2004) reported average A320 and 737-800 sale prices of $53.3 and $49.4 
million (2008 US$), respectively. A 35% discount from list prices was assumed, yielding 
an estimated base sale price of $50 million. 
 
Figure 41. Estimated Average Aircraft List Price Discounts for All Deliveries. 
Data Source: Boeing and EADS Annual Reports, 2000-09. 
 
Markish (2002) demonstrated that there is no correlation between aircraft 
deliveries and sale price. Therefore, it was assumed that market demand evolves 
independently of sale prices, while the relative differences in competitor’s sale price 
combined with lifecycle operating costs (i.e. TAROC) impacts market shares. A market-
based pricing model was assumed in which the aircraft price balances the other aircraft 
related operating costs. Forecasting prices forward, it was assumed that current aircraft 
prices remain constant in real terms, but manufacturers are able to negotiate price 
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increases proportional to reductions in lifecycle cost on the introduction of new aircraft, 
as shown in Figure 42. Assuming a basic bargaining game in which both parties have 
equal power, lifecycle operating cost reductions would be split evenly between the buyer 
and seller. Therefore, if a new aircraft with 25% fuel burn improvement yields an 
expected present value of $20.8 million in lifecycle cost savings (given the fuel price 
binomial lattice model in Table 9), it is assumed manufacturers would be able to increase 
sale price by $10.4 million. 
 
Figure 42. Cost Analysis Approach to Price Setting. Source: Ferreri, 2003. 
 
Market Share Model 
Airlines select the aircraft that gives them the highest utility. It was assumed that 
each manufacturer produces essentially equivalent aircraft, with fuel burn the only 
differentiating factor. But, due to past fleet decisions, airlines have generally committed 
to one manufacturer’s product line. Airlines prefer a fleet composed of aircraft from the 
same family to reduce training and maintenance costs, as well as the cost of spare part 
inventories. As of November 2010, 62 airlines worldwide had unfilled orders for the 737 
family while 82 airlines had unfilled orders for the A320 family. Only 6 airlines had 
unfilled orders for both. In the future it is expected that airlines will select the aircraft 
with the lowest TAROC, as long as the reduction of TAROC of the aircraft is greater 
than the switching cost the airline may incur.  
 Although Boeing has an advantage in the number of single aisle aircraft in the 
world’s fleet, Airbus holds 52% of unfilled orders (Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b). It is 
 78 of 113 
expected that incremental improvements in the fuel efficiency of one manufacturer’s 
aircraft are not enough to convince airlines operating the competitor’s aircraft to switch. 
A substantial operating cost improvement is required relative to the competitor’s to gain 
market share. It was assumed that some airlines will never choose to switch 
manufacturers, leaving some minimum market share that a manufacturer will maintain as 
long as they choose to produce their aircraft.  
A historical analysis was conducted to understand how aircraft performance 
impacts market share. Figure 33 shows the evolution of market shares in the single aisle, 
150-185 seat market segment, while Figure 43 and Figure 44 show historical market 
shares for twin aisle, medium sized jets in the medium and long range markets. In each 
figure, an estimation of the aircraft type fuel intensity at its R1 range and maximum 
payload is given for comparison. There are a number of confounding factors that prevent 
the determination of a statistical relationship between fuel intensity and market share. For 
example, jets with longer ranges must carry additional fuel, increasing fuel intensity. 
Also, although Boeing’s 767 and Airbus’ A330 compete in the same market segment, the 
A330 has a larger payload and range. Other operating costs were not compared in this 
analysis. Despite these shortcomings, several heuristics can be devised that were used to 
estimate the market shares of competing aircraft.  
 
Figure 43. Wide Body, Medium Range Market Share Analysis  
Data Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b. 
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Figure 44. Wide Body, Long Range Market Share Analysis. Data Source: Airbus, 2010b; Boeing, 2010b 
 
The market share heuristics derived from the historical analysis were: 
• 15% Minimum Market Share: The minimum market share for an aircraft that a 
manufacturer still finds profitable to produce was assumed to be 15%, based on 
the wide body market segment historical analysis. Boeing’s 777 controls ~85% of 
the market vs. Airbus’s A340, while Airbus’s A330 takes ~85% of the market vs. 
Boeing’s 767. 
• 50%/50% Split for Equivalent Aircraft: Aircraft with equivalent performance are 
assumed to split the market, as the 737-800 and A320 do currently. 
• Switching Costs: Switching costs prevent airlines from receiving a higher utility 
from aircraft that have a marginally (e.g. <5%) performance advantage. 
Therefore, incremental improvements generally do not result in market share 
increases as competitors generally match each other’s incremental improvements, 
with some time lag. 
These heuristics were used to estimate long-run market shares for aircraft in different 
competitive situations. Table 11 shows the market share assumptions for the two-player 
incumbent manufacturer games, while Table 12 and Table 13 show the assumptions for 
the three-player games that include a new entrant. It was assumed that if the new entrant 
produces an aircraft of superior performance to the incumbent’s current product, the new 
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entrant would take market share. The amount of market share would be dependent on the 
level of performance of the new entrant’s aircraft. An aircraft with equivalent 
performance to the incumbents’ new aircraft was assumed to leave stagnant incumbents’ 
products with the minimum market share. But, if the new entrant’s aircraft has the 
performance of the incumbents’ re-engined aircraft, it would only capture 50% of the 
market from two unmoving incumbents. Such logical games were used to estimate the 
remaining market shares in each cell representing the intersection of the players’ 
strategies in the tables below. 
 
Table 11. Two-Player Game Market Share Rules 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 50%, 50% 35%, 65% 15%, 85% 
Re-engine 65%, 35% 50%, 50% 35%, 65% 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 85%, 15% 65%, 35% 50%, 50% 
 
Table 12. Three-Player Game Market Share Rules  
New Entrant Performance = Incumbent New 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 15%, 15%, 
70% 
15%, 25%, 
60% 
15%, 43%, 
43% 
Re-engine 25%, 15% 
60% 
25%, 25%, 
50% 
25%, 38%, 
38% 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 43%, 15%, 
43% 
38%, 25%, 
38% 
33%, 33%, 
33% 
 
Table 13. Three Player Game Market Share Rules  
New Entrant Performance = Incumbent Re-engined 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 25%, 25%, 
50% 
20%, 40%, 
40% 
15%, 55%, 
30% 
Re-engine 40%, 20% 
40% 
33%, 33%, 
33% 
25%, 50%, 
25% 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 55%, 15%, 
30% 
50%, 25%, 
25% 
40%, 40%, 
20% 
 
Without operating cost improvements, manufacturers could reduce TAROC by 
reducing the sale price, purchasing market share. This possibility is neglected in the 
model as it is assumed that manufacturers prefer to maintain a certain level of 
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profitability on existing models. For new aircraft models, there is an incentive to reduce 
sale price to gain market share, increase production numbers, and work down the learning 
curve. This option is not considered in this model, but is addressed in Benkard (2004). 
 As the purpose of this aircraft program valuation model is to estimate the rank 
order of manufacturer payoffs, these market share assumptions are sufficient. The 
impacts of these assumptions are tested in the sensitivity analysis of Section 5.3. The 
range of market share assumptions for which the outcome of the game is unchanged is 
determined. 
 
Production Capacity Constraints and Fixed Costs 
 Increasing demand or market share would require a manufacturer to expand their 
production facilities. Production capacity in the aircraft program valuation model is 
expanded at the beginning of each stage if the expected deliveries in the demand state 
exceed capacity. A one-time investment is made to expand capacity, but it was assumed 
that capacity is never lost. Therefore, if demand drops in the next stage, production 
capacity remains steady. It was assumed that manufacturers have fixed costs proportional 
to their production capacity. Therefore, if capacity is larger than demand at any stage, the 
manufacturer will be required to pay for excess capacity that is not utilized. Estimates of 
the expansion costs and fixed costs of unit production capacity (i.e. the ability to produce 
one aircraft per year) were derived from Boeing and Airbus annual reports.  
 
Expected Net Present Value Calculation 
 Table 14 summarizes the model input parameters, as well as the low and high 
values used in the sensitivity analysis performed in Section 5.3: 
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Table 14. Aircraft Program Valuation Model Assumptions 
Variable Low Base High Source/Units 
Investment, I – Maintain $0 $0 $0 Rothman (2010) 
Re-engine $1.0 ($1.0) $1.5 ($3.0) $3.0 ($6.0) Billion, <Airbus> (<Boeing>) 
New $5 $10 $15  
Learning Curve Slope, β 75% 80% 85% Benkard (2004) 
Theoretical First Unit Cost, c1 $260 $380 $500 million, Raymer (2006) 
Year 0 Quantity, q0 – Maintain  2000   
Re-engine  300   
New  0   
Sale price, p – Maintain $40 $50 $60 million 
Re-engine $50 $56.6 $63.2 million 
New $50 $60.4 $70.8 million 
Expansion Costs $0 $20 $30 million/unit capacity 
Fixed Costs of Capacity $0 $4 $6 Million/unit capacity 
Discount Rate 6% 8% 10%  
Single Aisle Market Demand, µ 2.36% 3.04% 3.66% Boeing (2010b) 
ν 10.2% 28.4% 45.0% Airbus (2010b) 
Jet Fuel Price, µ -0.23% 2.64% 4.59% EIA (2010) 
ν 22.0% 32.0% 42.8% ATA (2010a) 
 
To calculate the E(NPV) of a manufacturer’s strategy, the NPV and probability of each 
possible path through the demand lattice model was calculated. E(NPV) was the 
probability of each path times its calculated NPV. This approach was necessary as the 
path through the lattice model impacted the unit production cost (as the cost of any unit 
produced was dependent on how many previous units had been produced) and the fixed 
costs (as the production capacity was assumed to not contract). Figure 45 shows the 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for each symmetric strategy (i.e. where both 
players choose the same strategy, splitting the market) for the low fuel price scenario 
where fuel burn reduction technologies do not receive a higher sale price. The CDF 
curves for each strategy show the probability that the NPV of the aircraft program will be 
less than or equal to the NPV on the horizontal axis. The distribution of NPVs is a result 
of the uncertainty in future demand, as modeled using the binomial lattice model in Table 
8. The vertical dashed lines represent the E(NPV) for each strategy. 
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Figure 45. Aircraft Program Valuation Cumulative Distribution Functions for Symmetric Strategies 
 
Although the E(NPV) is used as the payoff in the game theory analysis in Chapter 6, each 
value represents a distribution of possible payoffs due to the uncertainty in demand and 
fuel prices discussed in Section 5.2. Table 15 displays statistics summarizing the 
distribution of payoffs for each strategy shown in Figure 45. The maintain strategy has 
the highest upside (represented by the 95% value) while the new strategy has the most 
downside (represented by the 5% value). There is significant variance in the valuation of 
each strategy, demonstrated by the standard deviation (Std).  
 
Table 15. Valuation Model Symmetric 
Strategy Statistics (billions US$) 
 New Re-engine Maintain 
E(NPV) $6.8 $25 $43 
Std $35 $36 $41 
95% $92 $111 $140 
5% $-16 $1.5 $12 
 
The assumption that players are risk neutral results in the competing firms 
ignoring each strategy’s distribution of NPVs. Utility functions that account for the 
different levels of risk inherent in each strategy could be used to relax this assumption, 
but this complexity was not considered. 
 84 of 113 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
A sensitivity analysis was performed to determine whether the aircraft program 
valuation model is robust, within the high and low range of input parameters listed in 
Table 14. Figure 46 shows that the aircraft program valuation model is most sensitive to 
the learning curve slope and theoretical first unit cost (TFUC) assumptions. In 
comparison, the development cost and discount rate assumptions have little impact on the 
E(NPV) of the new aircraft program.  
 
Figure 46. Sensitivity of New Aircraft Program E(NPV) to Changes in Input Assumptions 
 
The rank ordering of the three strategies (i.e. maintain, re-engine, and new), under 
each market share assumption in Table 11 was tested to determine if changes in the 
model inputs resulted in a change in the rank ordering of the decisions. Although the 
estimated value of the aircraft programs changed, the rank ordering of the payoffs did 
not, assuming a 50% market share. 
 Next, each high and low input value was tested individually to determine if it 
would change the outcome of the game, given the market share assumption in Table 11. 
The only parameters to change the outcome of the game were the low inputs for the 
learning curve slope and the theoretical first unit cost. By decreasing these values, the 
new aircraft option had a higher E(NPV), resulting in both players choosing to develop a 
new aircraft. No other parameters within the range investigated changed the outcome of 
the two-player game. A learning curve slope of 75% is generally thought to be optimistic, 
so the sensitivity of the model to this parameter was considered to be acceptable. 
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 The market share assumptions in Table 11 were tested to determine what 
magnitudes of changes were required to alter the outcome of the game. Each assumption 
was varied between 50% and 100%, with the reciprocal underperforming aircraft market 
share assumption varied between 50% and 0%. The outcome of the game was only 
sensitive to the re-engine vs. maintain market share assumption. Using the base case 
input parameters, the outcome of the game remained the same for the range 50% to 77%. 
It is unlikely that a re-engined aircraft would capture more than 77% of the market when 
competing against an in-production aircraft. 
 In general, the model was robust within the range of input parameters examined 
for the two-player game. The outcome of the game was only significantly changed by 
extreme input parameters. Therefore, it can be concluded that the aircraft valuation 
program models the competitive dynamics of the single aisle aircraft duopoly market 
robustly within the range of parameters indicated. 
5.4 Summary 
 Chapter 5 developed the aircraft program valuation model that is used in Chapter 
6 to estimate the rank ordering of payoffs under different market conditions to perform 
the game theory analysis. The model contains the primary features of an aircraft program 
(i.e. a research, development, testing, and evaluation investment; a production learning 
curve; fixed costs of production; production expansion investments; sales price 
assumptions; market share assumptions) as well as uncertainty of future demand for 
single aisle aircraft and fuel prices. Base case input parameters were derived from 
publicly available data sources. High and low estimates of the input parameters were used 
to test the sensitivity of the model to the input parameters and to demonstrate the range of 
input assumptions that resulted in the same outcome of the competitive game. The results 
of the two-player game were robust, providing confidence in the rank ordering of 
estimated payoffs. An organization with access to more detailed aircraft manufacturer 
financial data could develop a more detailed aircraft program valuation model and use the 
game theory analysis methodology in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER 6 
6.0 Game Theory Analysis of the Incentives to Innovate 
 
 
This chapter introduces a game theory framework of analysis to evaluate which 
factors may incentivize single aisle aircraft manufacturers to innovate. Manufacturers and 
policy-makers can apply the methodology developed here to improve the objective 
analysis of product line decisions and emission reduction policies. The aircraft program 
valuation model developed in Chapter 5 is used to estimate the payoffs for several static 
and dynamic games under different market scenarios. The static games demonstrate how 
various factors are likely to affect the outcome of the competitive game while the 
dynamic games give insight into the timing of the development of a new aircraft. The 
market scenarios tested were: (i) expectation of low fuel prices, (ii) technology forcing 
regulations, (iii) manufacturer subsidies, (iv) expectation of high fuel prices, and (v) new 
market entrants. First, a brief introduction to game theory is provided. 
6.1 Game Theory 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern founded the field of game theory in their seminal 
1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. They were in search of a more 
effective way of solving certain kinds of economic problems to account for the presence 
of others who are making decisions in accordance with their own best wishes (Davis, 
1997). In a competitive environment, game theory provides a framework to analyze the 
impacts of competition on players’ decisions. Lindstädt and Müller (2009) describe their 
use of game theory as a technique to support managerial decisions by developing a range 
of outcomes based on decisions by reasonable actors. In a complex world, there must be a 
balance between simplifying a problem to make it manageable and retaining enough 
complexity to make it relevant. Managers must be aware of the assumptions that were 
used to find a solution, as the final outcome is sensitive to the initial conditions.  
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A game has two or more players, each of whom are assumed to be rationally self-
interested, seeking the highest possible benefit. The key requirements of a game theory 
analysis are determining: (1) the structure of the game, and (2) the payoffs. The structure 
of the game is the set of strategies available to each player. A strategy is a player’s 
complete plan of action at each decision point to the end of the game. The payoffs 
available to each player for each strategy, given the other players’ strategies, represent 
the benefit the player achieves at the completion of the game. Payoffs can be monetary or 
non-monetary. Time, utility, and happiness may be equally or more important than 
money. The payoff to use in the game theory analysis is dependent on the assumed 
objective function of the players. The structure of the single aisle aircraft manufacturer’s 
games analyzed in this chapter was introduced in Chapter 4 while the aircraft program 
valuation model developed in Chapter 5 is used to estimate the payoffs.  
This analysis uses normal form games to determine the outcomes. A normal form 
game displays the strategies for each player, and the payoffs for each combination of the 
players’ strategies, in a matrix where the first number in each cell represents the payoff 
for Player A given Player B’s strategy, and the second number in each cell represents the 
payoff for Player B, given Player A’s strategy. The maximum number of players in the 
games analyzed in this chapter are three, but the constraints of a two dimensional page do 
not limit the possible number of players in a game theory analysis.  
The outcome of the game is determined by finding the Nash equilibrium. A Nash 
equilibrium is the predicted strategy for each player that is the best response to the 
predicted strategy of all other players (Gibbons, 1992). A dominant strategy has a higher 
payoff than all other strategies for a player, no matter what strategy the other player 
selects. In each normal form game presented, the underlined payoffs represent the best 
strategy for each player, assuming the other players’ strategy selection. For example, in 
Table 17: assuming Player B selects the maintain strategy, the set of possible payoffs for 
Player A is [43, 34, 29]. As 43 is the highest payoff, it is underlined to indicate that if 
Player B chooses to maintain, the best strategy for Player A is to maintain. To determine 
the Nash equilibrium, this logic is repeated for each strategy, for each player. The cell 
with payoffs for both players underlined represents the Nash equilibrium as neither player 
can choose a better strategy, given the actions of the other player.  
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Mixed strategy Nash equilibriums occur when a probability is assigned to each of 
the competitors’ strategies. Mixed strategies can be used to determine unique Nash 
equilibriums when multiple pure strategy equilibriums exist. Mixed strategies are not 
incorporated into this analysis, although they provide an interesting extension of 
complexity that could be incorporated into future work. 
The normal form games examined are solved simultaneously. Players are 
assumed to make their decisions within the same time frame. Although one player may 
announce their decision before the other, this action could simply indicate a signaling 
game in which one player attempts to impact the other player’s decision. The decision to 
proceed with an aircraft program is only truly made when significant disincentives to 
reversing the decision exist (such as a substantial order backlog for the new aircraft, or 
significant sunk costs in design and engineering work exist). 
It is assumed that all players have perfect information enabling competitors to 
determine each other’s payoffs for each strategy set. This assumption may not be entirely 
true in reality, but the aircraft program valuation sensitivity analysis performed in 
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the outcome of the two-player game is primarily sensitive to 
the learning curve assumptions. Therefore, as long as competing players’ learning curves 
are similar in nature, it is reasonable to assume that they are able to estimate competitors’ 
payoffs within the margin of error required to maintain the same outcome of the game. 
This is a conceptual analysis in which players are assumed to be symmetric, 
except for the difference in re-engining investment required by Player A and Player B (as 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5). Labeled A, B, and C, the players in the games presented 
are not meant to reflect real world manufacturers. It is assumed that Players A and B are 
incumbent manufacturers that have existing single aisle aircraft product lines, while 
Player C is a new competitor with the strategy set [Enter, Don’t Enter].  
Nine games are examined, as summarized in Table 16: 
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Table 16. Overview of Games Played  
Expectation(Fuel Price) indicates the low fuel price (-) or increasing fuel price (+) scenarios. 
Games  Players  Type  E(Fuel Price) 
  2  3  Static  Dynamic  -  + 
1) Expectation of Low Fuel Prices  x    x    x   
2) Technology Forcing Regulations  x    x    x   
3) Manufacturer Subsidies  x    x    x   
4) Expectation of High Fuel Prices  x    x      x 
5) New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity    x  x      x 
6) New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity    x  x      x 
7) Two-Player Dynamic Game  x      x    x 
8) New Entrant Dynamic Game, -25%    x    x    x 
9) New Entrant Dynamic Game, -15%    x    x    x 
 
Game 1 is the base case against which the other games are compared to 
understand how the scenario examined impacts the outcome of the game. Complexity is 
built up with each game, providing an understanding of how different factors change the 
expected outcome of the game. Two- and three-player games were analyzed to 
understand the impact of new competition on the current duopoly market. Static and 
dynamic games were used to show how long-term product line strategies might impact 
decisions made in the present. The expectation of future fuel prices had important 
impacts on the outcome of the games investigated. The first three games were played 
under the expectation of low fuel prices, while the remaining games assumed increasing 
fuel prices. 
6.2 Two-Player Static Games 
Game 1: Expectation of Low Fuel Prices 
 
  Figure 47. Game 1 Expectation of Low Fuel Prices Decision Timeline 
 
Under the expectation of low fuel prices, incumbent manufacturers are not able to 
increase the sale price of a new aircraft as fuel cost savings are negligible over the course 
of the aircraft’s life. The incentive to develop a new aircraft is to gain market share from 
a competitor or to raise entrance barriers to protect against new entrants. Table 17 shows 
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that the status quo is the competitive equilibrium. Both incumbents maintain their current 
aircraft, reaping large profits while splitting the market. The development of a new 
aircraft is strictly dominated for both players. This scenario provides a baseline against 
which scenarios explored in the next sections can be compared to understand their 
impacts. 
Table 17. Game 1 Low Fuel Prices 
E(NPV) billions 2010 US$. (Player <A>, <B>) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 43, 43 32, 33 18, 29 
Re-engine 34, 32 25, 24 17, 16 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 29, 17 16, 15 7, 7 
 
Game 2: Technology Forcing Regulations 
 
Figure 48. Game 2 Technology Forcing Regulations Decision Timeline 
 
If low fuel prices are expected, a technology forcing regulation could be 
implemented to obsolete existing aircraft product lines, forcing manufacturers to re-
engine or develop a new aircraft. Rutherford and Zeinali (2009) point out that if the 
standard applied to new aircraft types, grandfathering in existing production lines, the 
introduction of new aircraft designs may be delayed to avoid triggering the standard. It is 
assumed here that the regulation would force manufacturers to either exit the market, re-
engine, or develop a new aircraft within a five-year time frame (i.e. one stage in the 
valuation model). Exiting the market would be preceded by a phase-in period in which 
incumbent manufacturers sell their current product lines while replacements are 
developed, resulting in a positive exit payoff, as shown in Table 18. The predicted 
equilibrium is for manufacturers to harvest their existing product lines while making the 
minimum investment to meet the regulation by re-engining. Incumbent manufacturers 
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would not have an incentive to make the larger investment required to develop a new 
aircraft in the near-term.  
 
Table 18. Game 2 Technology Forcing Regulations 
  Player B 
  Exit Re-engine New 
Exit 11, 11 11, 57 11, 39 
Re-engine 59, 11 25, 24 17, 16 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 39, 11 16, 15 7, 7 
 
In this scenario, the manufacturers’ payoffs are reduced by 40% from the low fuel 
price scenario. This suggests that manufacturers have a significant incentive to lobby 
against technology forcing regulations that would obsolete their existing product lines 
unless the regulations yield additional benefits for the incumbents. Games 5 and 6 
introduce a new entrant to the market. Increased competition may further erode 
manufacturer payoffs as the market is split between three competitors instead of two. 
Although technology-forcing regulations may force incumbents to move, they have the 
additional effect of raising market entrance barriers by requiring higher technology levels 
that favor entrenched incumbent manufacturers. Therefore, under the threat of a new 
market entrant, incumbent manufacturers may use their political power to seek 
regulations that raise entrance barriers, creating a situation of regulatory capture in which 
government action protects incumbents at the expense of new competition (Stigler, 
1971).  
 
Game 3: Manufacturer Subsidies 
  
Figure 49. Game 3 Manufacturer Subsidies Decision Timeline 
 
Aircraft manufacturers have traditionally received substantial direct and indirect 
subsidies. The rationale by governments has been to support their national champion to 
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gain a larger global market share and induce spillover effects in related domestic 
industries whose value exceed the amount of the subsidy (Krugman, 1987; Busch, 2001). 
If so inclined, governments would likely provide matching subsidies, preventing their 
national champion from losing their competitive advantage in the global market.  
 To incentivize the development of a new aircraft, the payoff for a new-maintain 
strategy must be greater than the payoff for a maintain-maintain strategy. Based on our 
model’s assumptions and the expectation of low fuel prices, governments would need to 
provide new aircraft subsidies on the order of  $15 billion to increase the new-maintain 
payoff to shift the competitive equilibrium, as shown by comparison of Table 19 and 
Table 17.  
Table 19. Game 3 Manufacturer Subsidies 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 43, 43 32, 33 18, 44 
Re-engine 34, 32 25, 24 17, 31 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 44, 17 31, 15 22, 22 
 
Krugman (1987) argues that free trade is the best rule of thumb. Gains from 
intervention are limited by uncertainty over the correct policies (as the exact payoffs in 
the real world are uncertain) and by general equilibrium effects (as promoting one sector 
diverts resources from others). Further, past subsidies have threatened trade wars between 
the United States and the European Union. Adverse political consequences could 
outweigh potential gains. Therefore, while subsidies may result in the production of an 
aircraft with improved fuel efficiency, subsidies could prove to be a potentially 
dangerous policy option that negatively impacts other sectors of each country’s economy 
through increased trade barriers. 
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Game 4: Expectation of Increasing Fuel Prices 
 
Figure 50. Game 4 Expectation of Increasing Fuel Prices Decision Timeline 
 
Under the expectation of increasing effective fuel prices (due to market forces 
and/or carbon pricing policies), it is assumed that manufacturers are able to increase the 
sale price of new aircraft that reduce fuel burn. The expected lifecycle fuel cost savings is 
split between the airline and manufacturer, as described in Chapter 5. Therefore, a new 
aircraft program yields increased revenue for the manufacturer, but requires a large 
capital investment and significant demand to reduce unit costs by working down the 
production learning curve. If demand does not develop as expected, this can be a risky 
endeavour. Table 20 demonstrates that the increased revenue from a higher sale price 
provides the incentive required to shift the equilibrium to a new aircraft for both players.  
 
Table 20. Game 4 Increasing Fuel Prices 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 43, 43 32, 48 17, 60 
Re-engine 50, 32 37, 35 24, 39 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 60, 17 39, 23 25, 25 
 
This game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma - each player would be better off maintaining 
their current aircraft, but each has an incentive to deviate, resulting in reduced payoffs for 
both. Implicit or explicit collusion between the incumbents could result in both 
manufacturers maintaining their current aircraft, receiving the highest combined payoffs, 
but testing airlines’ and governments’ willingness to accept competitive distortions. 
Collusion would result in technology levels stagnating, providing an opportunity for new 
entrants to develop a competitive aircraft that could take market share away from the 
incumbents, as discussed in the next section. In fact, the manufacturer subsidies 
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examined in Game 3 resulted in a Prisoner’s Dilemma as well, but the dilemma was 
induced by government intervention. Competitive forces induce the dilemma in Game 4. 
This scenario assumes a ~20% increase in new aircraft sale prices, resulting in a 
significant transfer of capital from airlines and leasing companies to manufacturers. 
Increased capital requirements would be offset by reduced airline operating costs over 
time, but it is uncertain whether additional capital is available for the airlines. The airline 
industry is highly competitive and has historically had limited profits. 
Undercapitalization of airlines could stall the introduction of new aircraft models by 
manufacturers. 
For the remainder of the games examined in this paper, the expectation of 
increasing fuel costs using the base case values shown in Table 14 were used to calculate 
the expected aircraft sale price increase over the base price. 
6.3 Three-Player Static Games 
 
Figure 51. New Entrant Extended Form Game 
 
With a new entrant, the game changes from a single move to two moves, as 
shown in Figure 51. In the first move, Player C decides whether or not to enter the 
market. In the second move, the incumbent manufacturers simultaneously choose their 
best response to the new entrant’s strategy. To deter Player C from entering the market, 
the incumbents could send credible threats of developing a new aircraft that is superior to 
the new entrant’s. Further, the new entrant could send a threat forcing the incumbents to 
decide their optimal strategy given their perceived probability of a new competitor 
entering the market. For this analysis, it is assumed that Player A and B decide their 
optimal strategy given Player C’s decision to enter the market. Given this outcome, 
Player C would decide whether or not to enter. Therefore, if Player C expected a negative 
E(NPV) given Player A and B’s  expected response to the new entrant, Player C would 
decide to not enter the market, returning the game to the two-player games discussed in 
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Games 1 to 4. Games 5 and 6 demonstrate that the performance of the new entrant’s 
aircraft impacts the outcome of the game. An aircraft with superior performance would 
capture a greater market share, reducing the incumbents’ payoffs further. 
 
Game 5: New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity 
 
Figure 52. Game 5 New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity Decision Timeline 
 
If the new entrant’s aircraft has superior performance to the incumbents’, the 
incumbents would expect to lose a significant number of sales, providing them with an 
incentive to develop a new aircraft. Assuming that sale prices are increased to reflect 
lifecycle fuel cost savings under the increasing effective fuel price scenario (as in Game 
4) and that the new entrant produces a new aircraft that meets the performance of the 
incumbent’s new aircraft option (i.e. a 25% fuel burn improvement), Table 21 shows that 
an equilibrium may exist in which one incumbent chooses to maintain while the other 
decides to re-engine. Although this equilibrium is sensitive to the input parameters in the 
aircraft program valuation model, the greater investment required by Player B to re-
engine results in an off-symmetric equilibrium. The superior performance of the new 
entrant’s aircraft captures a significant market share while Player A attempts to maintain 
market share by re-engining. Player B’s optimal strategy is to avoid the investment and 
maintain its current aircraft. Once the competitors’ new and re-engined aircraft enter 
service in stage 2, Player B suffers from a greatly reduced market share, but continues to 
make small profits due to its unit production cost advantage while harvesting its existing 
product line. The new entrant has a positive expected net present value in each possible 
outcome, except if both of the incumbents develop a new aircraft. This result suggests 
that there may be rents available in the single aisle market, providing an incentive for 
increased competition if new entrants are able to overcome the significant entrance 
barriers to develop an aircraft that can compete with the incumbents’ new aircraft option. 
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Table 21. Game 5 New Entrant, -25% Fuel Intensity 
E(NPV) billions 2010 US$. (Player <A>, <B>, <C>) 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 17.1, 17.1, 
29 
17.1, 16,  
20 
17.1, 17.3, 
5 
Re-engine 17.5, 17.1, 
20 
17.5, 16,  
11 
17.5, 13,  
1 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 17.3, 17.1, 
5 
13, 16,  
1 
9.5, 9.5,  
-2.4 
 
Game 6: New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity 
 
Figure 53. Game 6 New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity Decision Timeline 
 
Due to limited design and production experience, a new entrant may not be able 
to match the incumbents’ new aircraft option performance. In Game 6, it is assumed that 
the new entrant is only able to develop an aircraft that matches the performance of the 
incumbents’ re-engined aircraft (i.e. a 15% fuel burn improvement). A different off-
symmetric equilibrium is shown in Table 22. Player B develops a new aircraft to 
maintain a 50% market share while Players A and C split the remaining market by 
offering an aircraft with an inferior performance to Player B’s.  
 
Table 22. Game 6 New Entrant, -15% Fuel Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New 
Maintain 24.6, 24.6, 
11 
20.8, 27.4,  
3 
17.1, 28.8, 
-5 
Re-engine 29, 20.8,  
3 
23.7, 22.2,  
-2 
17.5, 24.2,  
-8 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
New 28.8, 17.1, 
-5 
24.2, 16.0,  
-8 
15.1, 15.1,  
-11 
 
The new entrant only receives a positive payoff if neither incumbent develops a 
new aircraft. This result suggests that a profit-maximizing firm would decide to not enter 
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the market. Therefore, incumbent manufacturers may not be concerned with new entrants 
unless there is a threat that they could match or exceed the performance of the 
incumbents’ new aircraft option. But, if a new entrant has government support, it may be 
profitable to enter the market. Further, if the new entrant has a different objective 
function than the incumbents’, other factors may make it beneficial to enter the market, 
such as spillover effects to other sectors of the economy, national pride, and military 
capabilities. Therefore, when determining the probability of a new competitor entering 
the market, additional factors must be taken into account. 
The three-player static games have shown how differences in the investment 
required by incumbent players may result in off-symmetric game equilibriums as well as 
how new competition in addition to increased expected fuel prices may shift the 
competitive equilibrium from the duopoly equilibrium in Game 1. 
6.4 Two-Player Dynamic Game 
If manufacturers consider how their decisions in the present impact future product 
line decisions, the game can be modeled dynamically where the evolution of demand and 
fuel prices impacts the equilibrium strategy set. Committing to a re-engined or new 
aircraft locks into a technology level for 10 or more years, requires an investment, and 
can be risky. Delaying the decision provides more flexibility for future actions, but gives 
competitors an opportunity to develop a superior aircraft. If it is assumed that both 
incumbent manufacturers will decide to proceed with a new aircraft by the third stage 
(i.e. 2020-24), a dynamic game (as depicted in Figure 54) can be evaluated to understand 
the timing of the decision, given the competitive scenarios developed in this section.  
 
Game 7: Two-Player Dynamic Game 
 
Figure 54. Game 7 Two-Player Dynamic Game Decision Timeline 
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The dynamic game examined has four stages: 2010-14, 2015-19, 2020-24, and 
2025-2039. Incumbent manufacturers are able to select the maintain, re-engine, or new 
strategies at each of the first two stages, but are forced to choose new in the third. It is 
assumed that the re-engine strategy is a stopgap until a new aircraft enters into service ten 
years after the re-engined aircraft. This creates a fourth strategy for the incumbents 
named delay. For the delay strategy, the decision to develop a new aircraft is delayed five 
years to the second stage, for entry into service in the third stage (2020-2024). 
The payoff for the new strategy was determined for the fourth stage, based on the 
expected demand and fuel prices. Increased fuel costs enabled manufacturers to increase 
the sale price of the new or re-engined aircraft while the existing aircraft sale price was 
assumed to hold constant in real dollar terms. Technology levels were assumed to 
improve at the rates shown in Figure 35. Therefore, delaying the decision enabled a 
superior aircraft to be developed that yielded a higher sale price, assuming the 
expectation of future fuel prices increased or remained constant. Backwards induction 
down each possible decision path, with each possible fuel and demand scenario, was used 
to determine the expected payoffs in present value terms in the normal form game shown 
in    Table 23. The dynamic game demonstrates that delaying the development of a new 
aircraft to take advantage of improved technology levels and increased sale prices may be 
the incumbents’ optimal strategy. 
 
   Table 23. Game 7 Two-Player Dynamic Game 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Maintain 38, 38 30, 39 35, 34 29, 48 
Re-engine 40, 30 31, 30 28, 34 31, 37 
New 34, 35 34, 26 27, 27 33, 31 
Pl
ay
er
 A
 
Delay 48, 29 37, 30 31, 33 35, 35 
 
The two-player dynamic game was repeated for each combination of the high/low 
fuel price and demand scenarios in Table 14. Higher fuel prices raise the value of fuel 
burn reduction technologies, enabling manufacturers to increase the sale price of new and 
re-engined aircraft, while high demand enables manufacturers to work down the 
production learning curve more rapidly and spread the fixed costs of development across 
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more aircraft. The low states have the opposite effects. It was found that varying demand 
did not alter the outcomes of the dynamic game, whereas the low fuel price scenarios 
resulted in both players selecting the maintain strategy. Therefore, as in the static game, 
the expectation of higher fuel costs drives manufacturers to develop a new aircraft. This 
is a result of the aircraft program valuation model’s greater sensitivity to price than 
demand, as shown in Figure 46. All dynamic game results displayed were found using the 
expectation of increasing fuel costs. 
6.5 Three-Player Dynamic Games 
Game 8: New Entrant Dynamic Game, -25% Fuel Intensity 
 
Figure 55. Game 8 New Entrant Dynamic Game, -25% Fuel Intensity Decision Timeline 
 
The dynamic game was played with a new market entrant in the 2015-19 time 
frame. This analysis enabled the understanding of how new competition – or the credible 
threat of new competition – may change the game. As in Games 5 and 6, the level of 
performance of the new entrant’s aircraft impacted the outcome of the game. A new 
entrant’s aircraft with the same performance as the incumbents’ new option would take 
significant market share unless the incumbents’ decide to move. A new entrant’s aircraft 
that has the same performance as the incumbents’ re-engined aircraft would capture less 
market share. 
 Table 24 shows that there are two potential pure strategy equilibriums. While the 
incumbents may find it most profitable to harvest their existing product lines, there is an 
incentive for one incumbent to develop a new aircraft, but not both. The incumbents play 
a waiting game, with the first one to move taking the risk of developing a new aircraft 
along with a higher expected payoff, while the other stands pat with the less risky 
maintain strategy. To determine which manufacturer is likely to move first would require 
information regarding the incumbent manufacturer’s assessment of the probability of a 
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new entrant and the new entrant’s aircraft performance. The manufacturer that believes it 
is more likely that a new competitor will enter the market with a competitive aircraft will 
be the first to move, resulting in the late mover delaying the introduction of their new 
aircraft until the fourth stage (2025-29). The payoffs for the first mover to select the new 
or delay strategy are very close, with payoffs that are sensitive to the assumptions of the 
aircraft program valuation model. Therefore, the timing of the first incumbent’s new 
aircraft entry into service may be either the second (2015-19) or third stage (2020-24). 
 
Table 24. Game 8 New Entrant 2015 Dynamic Game, -25% Fuel Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Maintain 16.7, 16.7, 
20.6 
16.7, 13.7, 
13.9 
16.7, 19.7, 
2.6 
16.7, 19.9, 
11.5 
Re-engine 15.2, 16.7, 
13.9 
15.2, 13.7, 
7.5 
15.2, 16.4, 
-0.4 
15.2, 18.3, 
6.8 
New 19.7, 16.7, 
2.7 
16.4, 13.7, 
-0.4 
11.9, 11.9,  
0.7 
14.8, 15.0, 
3.6 P
la
ye
r A
 
Delay 19.9, 16.7, 
11.5 
18.3, 13.7, 
6.8 
15.0, 14.8, 
3.6 
15.0, 15.0, 
10.3 
 
Game 9: New Entrant Dynamic Game, -15% Fuel Intensity 
 
Figure 56. Game 9 New Entrant Dynamic Game, -15% Fuel Intensity Decision Timeline 
 
If a new entrant is expected to develop an aircraft that has the same performance 
as the incumbents’ re-engined aircraft, the incumbents have an incentive to develop a 
new aircraft, as shown in Table 25. The Nash equilibrium is predicted to be the case were 
either Player A or B enters a new aircraft into service in 2015-19 while the other delays 
until 2020-24. Player C gains less market share than required to have a positive E(NPV), 
suggesting an early move by one of the incumbents could prevent the new competitor 
from entering the market. The incumbent that delays entry into service of a new aircraft 
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temporarily loses market share while it produces an aircraft inferior to the new entrant 
and the other incumbent, regaining market share in the third stage (2020-24) when it 
introduces a new, superior aircraft. If both incumbents delay the entry into service of a 
new aircraft, the new entrant is able to capture significant market share in the short term, 
increasing its payoff, and the likelihood of entry.  
 
Table 25. Game 9 New Entrant 2015 Dynamic Game, -15% Fuel Intensity 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Maintain 22.8, 22.8, 
6.1 
20.1, 21.9, 
-0.2 
17.5, 28.9, 
-6.0 
20.4, 27.9, 
0.2 
Re-engine 23.4, 20.1, 
-0.2 
20.0, 18.5, 
-4.2 
16.0, 25.6, 
-8.6 
19.7, 24.7, 
-4.5 
New 28.9, 17.5, 
-6.0 
25.6, 14.5, 
-8.6 
19.7, 19.7, 
-12.3 
24.7, 20.7, 
-10.1 P
la
ye
r A
 
Delay 27.8, 20.4, 
0.2 
24.7, 18.2, 
-4.5 
20.7, 24.7, 
-10.1 
23.6, 23.7, 
-4.4 
 
 The three-player dynamic games are sensitive to the aircraft program valuation 
model and market share assumptions, but are used here to demonstrate how the credible 
threat of new competition may lead incumbent manufacturers to select different strategies 
depending on their own risk tolerance and assessment of the threat of new competition. 
6.6 Summary 
The static Games 1 to 6 demonstrated the impact of different scenarios on the 
single-aisle aircraft manufacturer’s competitive game. Dynamic decision-based analysis 
was introduced to combine multiple factors in Games 7 to 9, demonstrating how a game 
theory analysis of the single aisle aircraft market segment may be used to determine the 
optimal timing of manufacturer’s strategies. Table 26 summarizes the games discussed, 
showing that while subsidies or expected increasing fuel prices may incentivize the 
development of new aircraft, consideration of longer-term strategies in the dynamic game 
may provide incentives for manufacturers to delay the entry of a new aircraft. This may 
result in superior performing aircraft that enter into service in the next decade, at the cost 
of increased carbon emissions in the near-term. Kar (2010) showed that early entry into 
service of available technology (as opposed to delaying entry for more advanced 
technologies) has greater potential to improve fleet fuel-burn performance due to the 
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dynamics of fleet turnover. Therefore, public policies may be required to incentivize the 
development of new aircraft. 
 
Table 26. Summary of Game Equilibriums 
  Player B 
  Maintain Re-engine New Delay 
Maintain (1) Low Fuel prices   (8) Dynamic Game (New Entrant, -25%) 
Re-engine (5) New Entrant, -
25% Performance 
(2) Technology 
Forcing Regulations 
(6) New Entrant, -
15% Performance  
New   (3) Subsidies (4) High Fuel Prices 
(9) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -15%) P
la
ye
r A
 
Delay (8) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -25%)  
(9) Dynamic Game 
(New Entrant, -15%) 
(7) Dynamic Game  
(2-player) 
 
 Different assumptions in the model may lead to different outcomes. For example, 
Games 5 and 6 (the static, three-player games) were sensitive to the reduced investment 
required by Player A to re-engine. Further, the dynamic games were sensitive to the 
expectation that fuel prices will increase. If fuel prices were to drop, the sale price of a 
new aircraft with large fuel burn improvements is assumed to decrease, reducing the 
incentives to develop a new aircraft. This analysis assumed that all players are rational, 
risk-neutral, profit-maximizing firms. Payoffs for firms with different risk tolerances 
would be altered, potentially leading to different off-symmetric equilibriums not explored 
in this analysis. New entrants to the market from China and Russia may have alternative 
objective functions. Other manufacturers may attempt to maximize market share, 
minimize costs, or maximize revenues. Softer factors, such as national pride or technical 
curiosity, may lead players to make seemingly irrational decisions when evaluated in 
profit maximizing terms. Therefore, although this analysis has demonstrated how a 
variety of factors and policies may impact the competitive game, it is important for 
managers and policy makers to understand the assumptions and the limitations of the 
game theory analysis. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.0 Conclusions 
 
 
Effective fuel cost increases due to crude oil market prices and environmental 
charges may result in air service reductions that have negative economic and social 
impacts. The 2004-08 fuel price surge was used as a historical case study to further 
understanding of the short- and medium-term impacts of effective fuel cost increase on 
the US air transportation system. It was found that non-hub airports serving small 
communities lost 12% of connections, compared to a system-wide average loss of 2.8%. 
Increased effective fuel costs will provide incentives for airlines to improve fleet fuel 
efficiency, reducing the environmental impacts of aviation, but may cause an uneven 
distribution of social and economic impacts if small communities suffer greater loss of 
mobility. Government action may be required to determine acceptable levels of access as 
the system transitions to higher fuel costs. 
One long-term hedge against increasing effective fuel costs is efficiency 
improvements. Aircraft fuel intensity has historically decreased at a rate of 1.2%-2.2% 
per year, but fleet fuel intensity improvements have stalled during the past decade. To 
improve aviation’s fuel efficiency new single aisle aircraft with higher technology levels 
will be required. Competition is an important factor to consider when designing policies 
to reduce aviation’s environmental impacts.  
This report outlined a framework of analysis for competition in the single-aisle 
aircraft market segment. Using an aircraft program valuation model and a game theoretic 
approach, the impacts of market changes on manufacturers’ decisions to maintain, re-
engine, or develop new aircraft was investigated. It was found that subsidies and higher 
fuel prices should provide sufficient incentives for incumbent manufacturers to develop 
new aircraft, but may lead to Prisoner’s dilemmas in which manufacturers would be 
better off not moving from the status quo. New competition in the market segment is 
likely to trigger innovation as incumbent manufacturers attempt to produce more efficient 
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aircraft that maintain sales in a market with increased competition. Interestingly, it was 
found that a new entrant’s aircraft that offers a fuel efficiency improvement on the order 
of 15% may incentivize the incumbent manufacturers to develop a new aircraft while a 
new entrant with a 25% fuel burn improvement may cause incumbents to select a less 
risky strategy. Dynamic games demonstrated that the incumbents’ optimal strategies 
might be to delay the entry of new single aisle aircraft until 2020-24. As political pressure 
mounts to take action on climate change and airlines search for ways to reduce operating 
costs in the face of rising effective fuel costs, delaying may not be acceptable. This 
situation could result in government intervention to incentivize the development of new 
aircraft. 
A number of further complexities could be explored using the framework 
developed in this report. It was assumed that competitors act with perfect information. 
Imperfect information would cast doubt on the technical capabilities of competitors’ 
aircraft(s) as well as financial payoffs. Incumbent manufacturers could collude either 
implicitly or explicitly to select the strategy that yields the highest total payoff with least 
risk. The riskiness of new aircraft programs was not incorporated into this analysis. Risk-
averse or risk-seeking players may change the outcome of the games or result in unique 
Nash equilibriums in the three-player dynamic games examined. Further, it was assumed 
that all manufacturers have the same objective function – to maximize expected net 
present value of a program. But aircraft manufacturing has spill over effects that impact 
other sectors of a nation’s economy, providing incentives for governments to subsidize 
new aircraft programs that may otherwise not be profit maximizing.  
This work is an initial step in using game theory to understand the impacts of 
competition, market conditions, and technological progress on large commercial aircraft 
manufacturer decisions. A number of simplifying assumptions have been made in the 
models presented to facilitate the analysis of a problem that quickly scales in complexity. 
To tackle this problem in a more holistic manner, a multidisciplinary approach should be 
implemented in which the technical and financial implications of strategic options are 
integrated into the decision making process. The question of what level of performance to 
design into the next generation aircraft has a continuous solution set, not the three-
pronged strategy set used in this work. The technical risk of increasing performance of a 
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new aircraft impacts the financial risk of the program, while external market conditions 
outside of the control of managers will ultimately determine the success of a new 
program. Therefore, manufacturers and policy makers will require more complex and 
integrated tools to understand the implications of their decisions and to tackle aviation’s 
environmental challenges. 
The application of game theory to management problems is still a nascent field. 
Game theory provides a simple, yet powerful tool to insert objective, competitive analysis 
into the decision making process. The decision analysis methodology developed in this 
report could be generalized to other applications and fields, such as: semiconductor 
fabrication plant investment decisions, automobile product line decisions, and airline fleet 
planning decisions. Investment decisions made by agents in a competitive environment 
could benefit from a game theory analysis to determine their best strategy, given their 
competitors’ likely response. 
While aircraft efficiency improvements will reduce airline operating costs, it is 
uncertain whether reductions in air service would be mitigated. Further, to meet 
environmental goals, efficiency may not be enough. Herring (2006) challenges the idea 
that improving the efficiency of energy use will lead to a reduction in energy 
consumption. Energy efficiency lowers the implicit price of energy, potentially leading to 
greater use. As a greater share of the world’s population gains access to affordable air 
transportation in developing countries, aviation’s environmental externalities will 
continue to grow. To face the world’s climate change challenge without limiting the 
economic enabling effects of air transportation by suppressing demand, aircraft 
technology will need to be improved. The incentives for manufacturers to stand still will 
need to be overcome.  
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APPENDIX 
9.0 Airline Classification 
 
Although it is expected that carriers within the same classification vary 
significantly in their businesses, markets, and operations, airlines were classified to 
simplify the presentation of data. The following categories were used to group airlines 
with similar business models, based on common practices found in the literature and the 
author’s discretion. The top two US airlines in each category, by July 2007 available seat 
miles (ASM), are listed: 
• Network Legacy Carrier (NLC) – airlines that flew interstate routes prior to 
deregulation in 1978, have international operations, and are certified under Part 
121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including American Airlines 
and United Air Lines. 
• Low Cost Carrier (LCC) – airlines that have a stated low fare business model, 
and are certified under Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, 
including Southwest Airlines and JetBlue Airways. 
• Regional – feeder, charter, and commuter airlines that fly aircraft less than 100 
seats, and are certified under Part 121 of Title 14 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations, including Skywest Airlines and Expressjet Airlines. 
• Commuter – commuter and on demand airlines that are certified under Part 135 
of Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, including Hageland Aviation 
Service and Boston-Maine Airways. 
 
 
